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SUMMARY EXPUNGEMENT OF




A person who obtains registration of a trade mark under the Trade Marks
Act' acquires a very valuable right. Unless his registration is shown to be in-
valid, 2 he may prevent anyone else using the same trade mark anywhere in
Canada 3 on any of the wares or services to which his registration extends. 4 In
addition, the registrant may prevent the use of a confusing trade mark or trade
name, 5 namely, any mark or name, whether in respect of the same wares or
services or others, which would likely lead to the inference that the latter's
wares, services or business are associated with the former's trade mark or
business. 6 The registrant may also prevent uses of his mark by others in a man-
ner likely to depreciate the value of its goodwill. 7 As well as obtaining injunc-
tive and ancillary relief, the registrant may sue either in the Federal Court or a
competent provincial court to recover damages or an account of profits in
respect of such infringements.
8
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I R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10. All references to sections henceforth shall, unless the con-
trary is stated, be to the Trade Marks Act.
2 Trade Marks Act, s. 19. The burden of showing invalidity rests on the person
challenging it: Bayer Co. v. American Druggists' Syndicate Ltd., [1924] S.C.R. 558 at
570, rev'g [1923] Ex. C.R. 65; La Maur Inc. v. Prodon Industries Ltd.,[1971] S.C.R.
973 at 977, 20 D.L.R. (3d) 10 at 12, 2 C.P.R. (2d) 114 at 117.
3 Section 19. Where a mark has been admitted to registration pursuant to s. 12(2)
upon a showing of distinctiveness, the Registrar has power to limit the registration to
the territory where such distinctiveness is shown: s. 31(2). The Court has asserted a
similar power in proceedings commenced before it: Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison
Ltde, [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 313 at 318-20, 53 C.P.R. 71 at 76-78, 36 Fox Pat. C. 179 at
184-86 (point not disputed on appeal, [1970] S.C.R. 942-43, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 740-41, 1
C.P.R. (2d) 14-15).
4 Bonus Foods Ltd. v. Essex Packers Ltd., [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 735 at 742-43, 49
D.L.R. (2d) 320 at 325,43 C.P.R. 165 at 171.
5 Section 20.
6 Section 6.
7 Section 22. The leading decision on this provision is Clairol International Corp. v.
Thomas Supply & Equipment Co., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552, 38 Fox Pat. C. 176.
8 Section 53.
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The grant of such rights is accompanied by certain quite modest burdens
which the registrant must bear in order to maintain the validity of his registra-
tion. He must of course bear the filing fees and legal costs of registration and
overcome any opposition to the grant of the registration, as well as the cost of
periodic renewals of the registration. 9 Apart from these monetary burdens the
registrant must ensure the continuing validity of his registration. He must take
steps to retain the continuing distinctiveness of his mark so that it continues to
identify wares or services with which he is associated. 10 In this respect, he must
take care that his mark does not lose its significance as a mark and fall into the
language as a common word denoting or describing a product. I" If he allows
others to use the mark, he must ensure that they are promptly registered as per-
mitted users under the Act. 12
Normally, registration of a trade mark is granted on the basis of the appli-
cant having been the first person to use it in Canada or at least having filed an
application asserting an intention so to use it. In the latter case, that of a pro-
posed trade mark, the mark is not registered unless evidence that its use has
commenced is presented to the Registrar of Trade Marks within six months of
his having allowed the application for the mark. 13 Registration without actual
use of the mark having first occurred in Canada is permitted in only two other
instances: first, when the mark has become well known in Canada as a result
of foreign use coupled with advertising or distribution of the wares or services
in Canada; 14 secondly, where the mark has been registered and used abroad. 15
The purpose of registration is thus to grant rights in trade marks that are gen-
9 Registrations must be renewed every 15 years: s. 45(4)(d).
10Subsection 18(1)(b). This reflects the trade mark's primary purpose as an in-
dicator of source: see generally, Stewart, The Source Theory and Trade Mark Reform:
A FunctionalAnalysis (1982), 20 U.W.O.L. Rev. 337.
1 See, e.g., Aladdin Industries Inc. v. Canadian Thermos Products Ltd., [1969] 2
Ex. C.R. 80, 57 C.P.R. 230,41 Fox Pat. C. 26, where the mark THERMOS for vacuum
bottles survived a challenge on this ground.
12 Section 49. Use of a registered mark by an unregistered licensee renders the mark
non-distinctive of the registrant and liable to be expunged: see, e.g., Motel 6 Inc. v. No.
6Motel Ltd. (1981), 56 C.P.R. (2d) 44 at 62-64 (F.C.T.D.); Lindy v. Reg. T.M. (1981),
123 D.L.R. (3d) 292 at 296, 57 C.P.R. (2d) 127 at 132 (F.C.T.D.); Barrigar, Getting the
MessageAcross in Canada (1980), 8 P.T.I.C. Bull. 428 at 432 et seq.
The position is different in countries whose trade mark legislation is based on the
Trade Marks Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 22 (U.K.): Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd.,
[1980] F.S.R. 85, 124 S.J. 184 (C.A.); Pioneer Electronic Corp. v. Reg. T.M. (1977), 17
Aust. L.R. 43 at 53-54, (1978), 52 Aust. L.J. Rep. 79 at 84-85; Adcock-Ingram
Laboratories Ltd. v. SA Druggists Ltd., [1982] 1 S.A.L.Rep. 856 (S. Africa),
distinguishing "Canadian decisions to the contrary" at 860-61, rev'd on other grounds,
[1983] 2 S.A.L.Rep. 350 (Transraal Prov. Div.). For criticism of the current Canadian
position, see Bereskin, Trade Mark Licensing and Registered Users in Canada (1972), 11
C.P.R. (2d) 244; Klar, An Argument for the Restructuring of the Law of Trade Marks
(1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 223 at 229 et seq.
13 Subsections 39(2),(3). The Registrar is however prepared to allow extensions of
.time, pursuant to s. 46, of up to 12 months to file the declaration of use.
14Subsection 16(1); s. 5. As to the meaning of "made known" under s. 5, see
Valle's Steak House v. Tessier (1980), 49 C.P.R. (2d) 218 at 225-26, [1981] 1 F.C. 441 at
450 (F.C.T.D.).
15 Subsection 16(2). A less rigorous standard of registrability may apply in respect
of such marks: s. 14.
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uinely intended to be used in trade. The Act has not been set up as a sort of
copyright registry of trade marks to promote the business of devising trade
marks so that they may be bought and sold as commodities. It is there for the
use of trademarks in business, not for business in trademarks. 16 The particular
rights are granted so that the registrant can build up a trade through the draw-
ing power of his congenial trade symbols. He may ultimately choose to sell his
mark and its goodwill, and thereby reap the rewards of his enterprise. But a
mark which is no longer used by the registrant has no real claim to continuing
protection under the Trade Marks Act: a mark without trade is no trade mark.
Under the Trade Marks Act there are two means whereby the registration
of a mark which is not being used may be expunged. The first is by an in-
terested person 17 moving the Trial Division of the Federal Court to expunge
the registration on the basis that the mark has been abandoned by its registrant
and that accordingly the registration is invalid. 18 Proof of abandonment,
however, is quite strict. It is not sufficient merely to show that the trade mark
is no longer being used; the registrant must also be shown to have intended to
abandon the mark.19 An intent to abandon may be demonstrated by a con-
clusive act, for example if the registrant voluntarily applies to the Registrar of
Trade Marks to cancel the registration. 20 More often than not, the intent must
be proved by circumstantial evidence. A long period of non-use, coupled with
passive acceptance of widespread infringement, may suffice. 21 So may the
adoption of a different mark in respect of the same wares, 22 or the discon-
tinuation of dealing with the wares altogether, unless the cessation was due to
circumstances beyond the registrant's control. 23 In practice, however, proof of
abandonment by circumstantial evidence is a difficult and costly enterprise. A
registrant who has not used his mark for a long time and finds someone else
now interested in using it is not likely to take kindly to the interloper's pro-
posal. As the proud possessor of a registered mark, he feels entitled to demand
tribute of anyone who wishes to use it or else to adopt a dog-in-the manger at-
titude of "I'm not using it, but you can't either".
16John Batt & Co. v. Dunnett, (1899) 16 R.P.C. 411 at 413, per Halsbury L.C.
arguendo: "The Trade Marks Acts are not for copyright in marks, they are to protect
trade marks. If you have no goods you are claiming only copyright, you are not claim-
ing for the purpose of protecting your trade." C.f. In Re American Greetings Corp.'s
App., The Times, April 30, 1983 (C.A.): registration of licences to use "HOLLY HOB-
BIE" mark refused because "trafficking" in the mark would tend to be facilitated
(Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 &2 Geo. 6, c. 22, s. 28(6) U.K.).
17 Defined in s. 2.
18 Subsection 18(1)(c); s. 57.
19 Western Clock Co. v. Oris Watch Co., [1931] Ex.C.R. 64 at 69, 2 D.L.R. 775 at
779; Marineland Inc. v. Marine Wonderland & Animal Park Ltd., [1974] 2 F.C. 558 at
574, 16 C.P.R. (2d) 97 at 110-11 (F.C.T.D.).
20 Subsection 40(l)(b).
21 Saxon Industries Inc. v. Aldo Ippolito & Co. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 79 at 95
(F.C.T.D.).
22Bayer Co. v. American Druggists' Syndicate Ltd., supra note 2, at 600;
Silhouette Products Ltd. v. Prodon Industries Ltd., [1965] 2 Ex.C.R. 500 at 511, 30 Fox
Pat C. 129 at 138,47 C.P.R. 183 at 193, affd (1967), 35 Fox Pat. C. 111.
23 Bayer's case, supra note 2, at 598-99.
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It was to provide a second alternative and simpler method of cleansing the
Trade Marks Register of unused marks that a system of summary expunge-
ment was first introduced into Canadian trade mark legislation in 1953 as sec-
tion 44 of the Trade Marks Act. Especially over the past few years this provi-
sion has engendered a spate of litigation. As a result, some matters have been
considerably clarified, others have remained obscure, and still others have
been confused as a result of conflicting decisions in the Trial Division of the
Federal Court. It seems therefore an opportune moment to review the current
state of affairs under section 44. 24 That is the purpose of this article.
Section 44 reads as follows:
(1) The Registrar may at any time and, at the written request made after three
years from the date of the registration by any person who pays the prescribed fee
shall, unless he sees good reason to the contrary, give notice to the registered
owner requiring him to furnish within three months an affidavit or statutory
declaration showing with respect to each of the wares or services specified in the
registration, whether the trade mark is in use in Canada, and, if not, the date when
it was last so in use and the reason for the absence of such use since such date.
(2) The Registrar shall not receive any evidence other than such affidavit or
statutory declaration, but may hear representations made by or on behalf of the
registered owner of the trade mark or by or on behalf of the person at whose re-
quest the notice was given.
(3) Where, by reason of the evidence furnished to him or the failure to furnish
such evidence, it appears to the Registrar that the trade mark, either with respect to
all of the wares or services specified in the registration or with respect to any of
such wares or services, is not in use in Canada and that the absence of use has not
been due to special circumstances that excuse such absence of use, the registration
of such trade mark is liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.
(4) When the Registrar reaches a decision as to whether or not the registration
of the trade mark ought to be expunged or amended, he shall give notice of his
decision with the reasons therefor to the registered owner of the trade mark and to
the person at whose request the notice was given.
(5) The Registrar shall act in accordance with his decision if no appeal
therefrom is taken within the time limited by this Act or, if an appeal is taken, shall
act in accordance with the final judgment given in such appeal.
(6) In this section, "Registrar" includes such person as may be authorized by
the Registrar to act on his behalf for the purpose of this section.2
5
II. HISTORY OF THE PROVISION
Under section 42 of the Trade Mark and Design Act 26 the Exchequer
Court had power to expunge "any entry made without sufficient cause" on the
Trade Marks Register. The provision was similar to one appearing in the
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883,27 which the English Court of
Appeal in J. Batt & Co. 's Mark28 held gave power to the court to expunge a
24 For a thorough review of the then current case law, see Mitches, Trade Mark Ex-
pungement under Canadian Law (1969), 15 McGill L.J. 392 at 397-413.
25 Subsection 44(6) was added by Statutes Law Amendments Act S.C. 1981, c. 47,
s. 46. As to its effect, see Kightley v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 65 C.P.R. (2d) 36 at 41-43
(F.C.T.D.).
26 R.S. 1906, c. 71.
2746-47 Vict., c. 57 (U.K.).
2 (1898), 15 R.P.C. 534.
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registration as regards both initial defects and matters arising subsequent to
the registration which rendered it unlawful for the mark to remain on the
register. Batt's case was originally held by the Exchequer Court to be ap-
plicable to section 42 of the Canadian Act.2 9 However, in 1924 a majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada, reversing a decision of the Exchequer Court
which had followed Batt's case, 30 held in The Bayer Co. v. American Drug-
gists' Syndicate Ltd.31 that section 42 of the Canadian Act did not empower
the Court to expunge a registration by virtue of matters arising after it had
been made. Thus, the fact that the registrant may have abandoned the mark
was irrelevant; the mark would continue to remain registered. Whether a de-
fendant could plead abandonment as a defence if sued for infringement was
left undecided. The majority of the Court considered Batt's case as not being a
persuasive authority, first, because the House of Lords had not considered it
necessary to decide the point when Batt was under appeal and, secondly,
because specific legislation was thought necessary to be enacted in subsection
35(1) of the British Trade Marks Act, 190532 empowering the High Court to
expunge "an entry wrongly remaining on the register."
33
Seen in restrospect, the majority's view in Bayer of the precedential value
of Batt's case in England was quite likely wrong. A citation from the leading
English text on trade marks supposedly supporting the holding34 was not ac-
companied by a reference to the earlier edition of that text immediately follow-
ing upon Batt's case which accepted its authority. 35 Further, in 1973 the House
of Lords in conducting an historical examination of English trade marks
legislation had no difficulty in accepting Batt's case as authority. Lord
Diplock said in a speech concurred in by the House that:
The alteration in wording of the Act of 1905 thus did no more than to spell out in
express words, and so place beyond doubt, a power which the Court of Appeal
had held as a matter of construction was conferred by the words already present in
the corresponding section of the Act of 1883.36
However, since no appeal was taken from Bayer's case to the Privy Coun-
cil, the law in Canada remained settled by the majority's decision in that case.
It was not until the enactment in 1932 of the Unfair Competition Act 37 that it
29 ReAutosales Gum & Chocolate Co. (1913), 14 Ex.C.R. 302, 306-309 per Cassels
J. See Smart, The Law of Trade-Marks and Designs in Canada (Toronto: Can. Law
Book, 1917) 62.
30 [1923] Ex.C.R. 65.
31 [1924] S.C.R. 558.
32 5 Edw. 7, c. 15 (U.K.).
33 Supra note 30, at 578 per Duff J.
34 Kerly and Underhay, The Law of Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and Merchandise
Marks (5th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1923) 344; cited by Duff J. in the Bayer case,
supra note 31, at 578-79. This edition of Kerly dealt only in passing with the 1883 Act
which had by then been superseded by two major revisions in 1905 and 1919.
35 Kerly, supra note 34 (2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1901) 280: "It would
seem, therefore, that if a registered proprietor ceases to carry on business, or abandons
all further intention to trade in the goods for which the mark is registered, or in any
other way renders it improper that the mark should remain on the Register, it can be
removed."
36 GE Trade Mark, [1973] R.P.C. 297 at 323 (H.L.).
371932 S.C., 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 38.
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became possible to expunge a registration for subsequent abandonment of the
mark. By subsection 52(1) of that Act, the Exchequer Court was given power,
at the suit of the Registrar or any "person interested", 3 8 to strike out or amend
any entry on the register if it "does not accurately express or define the existing
rights" of the registrant. This included the power to strike out the entry of a
mark which had subsequently been abandoned.3 9 In addition, the Registrar
was empowered, either of his own accord or at the request of any third party,
to send a notice to the registrant proposing that the registration be cancelled or
amended on the ground of non-use. The Registrar could however expunge or
amend only if the registrant agreed, if he failed to respond at all to the notice
within a specified period, or if the registration had not been renewed and the
appropriate renewal fee was not paid within a specified time. 40 Apart from
these situations, if the registrant made "any objection" to the proposed ac-
tion, the Registrar was precluded from acting.
4 1
One of the tasks facing the Fox Trade Mark Law Revision Committee
after its establishment in 1947 was to consider how the obvious deficiencies in
these provisions relating to expungement for subsequent non-use should be
remedied. The Committee in its 1953 Report recommended the enactment of
what is now section 44 of the Trade Marks Act. 42 There were two basic models
available to assist the Committee in framing the terms of section 44. One was
provided by the British Trade Marks Act, 1938, under which a trade mark
could be expunged by the Registrar 43 in his discretion on the basis of five years
continuous non-use, 44 unless the non-use was "shown to have been due to
special circumstances in the trade and not to any intention not to use or to
abandon" the mark. 45 The second model was provided by the American
Lanham Act of 1946,46 under which a registrant was obliged during the sixth
year after registration to file an affidavit "showing that the said mark is still in
use or showing that its non-use is due to special circumstances which excuse
38 Defined compendiously in s. 2(h) of the 1932 Act.
39 Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Industrial Designs (Toronto: U. of
Tor. Press, 1940) 167 etseq.
I Unfair Competition Act, 1932 S.C., 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 38, s. 49, 50.
41Id. s. 49(4).
42The Report is conveniently found in the Appendix to Fox, 2 The Canadian Law
of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition (2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1956) 1142; as to
s. 44, see id. 1175-176.
43 Under s. 37 of the Trade Marks Act 1905, 5 Edw. 7, c. 15, (U.K.), this jurisdic-
tion rested solely in the High Court. Under s. 26(1) of the 1938 U.K. Act 1 & 2 Geo. 6,
c. 22 the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction to expunge for non-use, except where
an action concerning the trade mark is pending, in which case s. 54(a) grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the High Court.
44 Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 22, s. 26(1)(b) (U.K.). A further ground
for expungement is lack of any bona fide intention to use the mark at the time of
registration, accompanied by a lack of user: s. 26(1)(a). See generally, Blanco White and
Jacob, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (10th ed. London: Sweet & Max-
well, 1972) paras. 11-35 etseq.
45 Use on goods of the same description as those covered by the registration con-
stitutes a discretionary reason against expungement: s. 26(1), proviso.
"Lanham Act, c. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§1051
etseq.).
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such non-use and is not due to any intention to abandon the mark." ' 47 Failure
to file an acceptable affidavit resulted in the Patent Office expunging the mark
at the end of the sixth year.
It seems that the Fox Committee drew its inspiration as regards section 44
largely from the British model. The Registrar would initially determine the
question of use or special circumstances excusing non-use, subject to an appeal
to the Exchequer Court. On the other hand, rather than leaving the matter to
be decided by means of a trial on full evidence before the Registrar, the Com-
mittee sought to emulate the United States model of having the issue resolved
by a simple affidavit showing use or special circumstances excusing non-use.
Whether this amalgam as conceived or put into practice is in fact a workable
scheme is a question upon which minds may well differ.
We now turn to an examination of section 44 and the way in which it has
been interpreted.
III. GENERAL PURPOSE OF SECTION 44
The trade marks register ought to furnish as accurate a picture as possible
of the marks which are in current active use. The obligation to use his mark is,
after all, the modest continuing toll the trade mark owner has to pay for the
considerable benefits registration confers on him. Marks no longer in use clut-
ter up the register and present unfair obstacles to later applicants wishing to
secure the same or an otherwise confusingly similar registration. 48 It is
therefore useful to have a simple, efficient and speedy procedure for trimming
the register of such "dead wood". 49 Section 44 of the Act is designed to pro-
vide such a system as an alternative to full-scale expungement proceedings
before the Federal Court. 50 In the past, both the Registrar and the Court have
been concerned to ensure that the summary nature of the procedure is preserv-
ed; thus, indirect attempts to turn section 44 into something resembling a full-
scale Federal Court proceeding for expungement on the grounds of abandon-
ment have been on the whole sought to be resisted.51 So too have procedural
47 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 s. 8(a) (1946). A similar affidavit must be filed when renew-
ing the registration: s. 9(a). See generally, Seidel, Dubroff & Gonda, Trademark Law &
Practice (New York: Boardman, 1963) ch. XIX.
48 See, e.g., Hermant v. Sunmaster Awning Co. (1959), 18 Fox Pat. C. 184 and
Frank W. Dorner Ltd. v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1970), 64 C.P.R. 270 (Reg. T.M.) where
marks cited during opposition were expunged under s. 44, causing the oppositions based
on such marks to collapse. The Trade Marks Office has refused to consider such ex-
punged marks during opposition proceedings where a pending appeal from expunge-
ment to the Federal Court has not, at the time of the hearing before the Registrar, been
prosecuted with despatch and resolved: Trafalgar Sportswear Ltd. v. Sabre (Sports-
wear) Ltd. (1981), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 243 at 245 (Reg. T.M.).
49 Wolfville Holland Bakery Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1964),.25 Fox Pat. C. 169 at 172, 42
C.P.R. 88 at 91 (Ex.Ct.); Lindy, supra note 12, at 294 (D.L.R.), 130 (C.P.R.).
50 Section 44 proceedings need not be resorted to before commencing an expunge-
ment proceeding under s.-57: cf. Battle Pharmaceuticals v. Lever Bros. Ltd., [1946]
Ex.C.R. 277 at 280, 2 D.L.R. 171 at 174, 5 Fox Pat. C. 160 at 162.
51 See, e.g., Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. Reg. T.M. (1970), 62 C.P.R. 268 at
277 (Ex.Ct.); Estde Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1972), 4 C.P.R. (2d) 4 at 5
(F.C.T.D.).
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manoeuvrings designed to stave off decisions on pending section 44 pro-
ceedings. Thus, a registrant whose horizon is clouded by an imminent section
44 hearing cannot clear it by commencing an infringement action and, when
the defendant pleads abandonment of the mark as a defence, seeking to per-
suade the Registrar to stay the section 44 proceedings pending the outcome of
the court proceedings. The Federal Court of Appeal has ruled that the
Registrar has no inherent power to stay section 44 proceedings or to postpone
his decision pending the outcome of other proceedings. 52
One problem, however, with regard to the whole underlying concept of
section 44 proceedings should be noted here. Although normally an applicant
to register has either used the mark or proposes to use it, an application may
also be made on the basis that the mark has been made known in Canada 53
even though use here has been minimal or indeed non-existent, or on the basis
that the mark has been registered in the country of origin5 4 of the applicant or
his predecessor in title and used abroad.55 The Act no doubt is designed to en-
courage such registrants to use the mark in Canada,5 6 but an unused mark that
is expunged under section 44 may still retain the basis upon which it was initially
granted Canadian registration. The fact that a mark is not used at the time of
the section 44 notice does not mean that it is not known in Canada in terms of
section 5 of the Act. Therefore, there seems no reason why the owner of such a
mark who has suffered or is even faced with the threat of expungement under
section 44 may not successfully apply to register the mark afresh by reason of
its still being well known in Canada or by reason of its foreign registration and
use. 57 Indeed, even more basically, an expunged registrant whose application
was originally based on use in Canada may theoretically re-apply on the same
basis or oppose an application for the same mark, citing his original first use.
This dysfunction between the operation of expungement and registrability
criteria certainly requires rethinking.
IV. INITIATING THE PROCEDURE
The procedure under section 44 is activated by the Registrar in one of two
ways, either of his own accord or upon a written request made by a third party.
From the point of view of a third party wishing to see an entry expunged, there
52Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Can. Ltd. (1982), 45 N.R.
126 at 134 (F.C.A.). A purported stay by the Registrar is not however a "decision" in
terms of s. 56(1) so that no appeal lies to the Trial Division. The proper procedure is to
seek a writ of mandamus or judicial review requiring the Registrar to perform his duty
of adjudication, pursuant to Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28,
18. See Goldie, "Judicial Review under Common Law Remedies and the Statutory
Code of Section 28 of the 'Federal Court Act' ", in Mendes da Costa (ed.), The Cam-
bridge Lectures (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) ch. 18.
53 Subsection 16(1); see note 14, supra.
54 As defined in s. 2.
55 Subsection 16(2).
56Re The Dover Engineering Group Ltd. (1977), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 123 at 125 (Reg.
T.M.).
57 Apparently a common phenomenon: see Gadban, Thoughts on Trade Mark Use
following Pharmaco (1982), 11 P.T.I.C. Bull. 630 at 636. Such an application will not
however have priority over any intervening user or applicant.
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are both advantages and disadvantages in having the Registrar act suo motu.
The principal advantage, apart from the fact that no fee is payable, is that the
Registrar may act "at any time"; one might expect the Registrar to do so just
before a registration is due to be renewed. 58 The principal disadvantage to any
action by the Registrar suo motu, so far as a third party is concerned, is that
the proceeding is one between the registrant and the Registrar only. A third
party is not entitled to be notified of any step in the proceeding or of the deci-
sion; he is not entitled to make representations to the Registrar; nor may he in-
itiate or be heard on any appeal from the Registrar's decision.5
9
A person wishing to set the procedure under section 44 in motion does so
by making a written request to the Registrar, accompanied by the prescribed
fee. The request may be made no earlier than three years after the mark has
been registered. The Registrar must act on the request "unless he sees good
reason to the contrary," a qualification no doubt intended to prevent
frivolous, vexatious or duplicative requests. 60 The notice should clearly specify
the person on whose behalf it is being sent; an unnamed or undisclosed prin-
cipal or, for that matter, any person other than the one specified as making the
request, is not entitled to make representations to the Registrar nor to initiate or
to be heard on any appeal from the eventual decision. 61 The requesting party is
not permitted to file any evidence or to counter or cross-examine 62 on any af-
fidavit filed by the registrant. This applies not only in respect of proceedings
before the Registrar but also, apart from exceptional circumstances, 63 on any
appeal to the Federal Court from this decision. 64 He may65 however, make
representations to the Registrar in opposition to those made by the registrant
58 Theoretically, no doubt, the Registrar may even be persuaded to serve a notice
under s. 44 very shortly after the registration is effected, although in practice he is
unlikely to do so in the absence of special circumstances.59 Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. Reg. T.M. (1971), 65 C.P.R. 209 (Ex.Ct.).
60 Subsection 44(1). Absent the qualification, the Registrar might have no discre-
tion to refuse a request: cf. Insurance Corp. of B.C. v. Reg. T.M. (1979), 44 C.P.R.
(2d) I at 11-12, [1980] 1 F.C. 669 at 681 (F.C.T.D.), on the word "request" in s. 9(1)(n)
of the Act.61 Supra note 59, at 214. The Court doubted whether rights under a s. 44 request
could be assigned. It also indicated that a notice on behalf of an unnamed principal may
be rejected as incomplete: cf. on an analogous point Holt Renfrew & Co. v. Henry
Singer Ltd., [1982] 4. W.W.R. 481 (Alta.C.A.) (caveat under Land Titles Act not
disclosing identity of caveator held invalid).
62The Registrar has no right to cross-examine on the affidavit either: The Molson
Co's. Ltd. v. Halter (1977), 28 C.P.R. (2d) 158 at 181 (F.C.T.D.).63 Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. Kiewel-Pelissier Breweries Ltd. (No. 1) (1972), 5
C.P.R. (2d) 212 at 214-15 (F.C.T.D.). This case may not be able to stand in the light of
subsequent authorities: see further, Part E of Section V.
64 Plough (Can.) Ltd. v. Aerosol Fillers Inc., [1981] 1 F.C. 679 at 688-89, 34 N.R.
39 at 46-47, 53 C.P.R. (2d) 62 at 69 (Fed. C.A.), adopting Jackett P.'s views in
Broderick's case, supra note 51, at 279.
65 The wording of s. 44(2), "may" hear representations, indicates that the Registrar
is not bound to hear either the registrant or the requesting party. Sound practice
however dictates that the Registrar should hold a hearing where either party requests
one. The Registrar's failure in this respect may not be subject to appeal but only
reviewable under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, supra
note 52.
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and is entitled to receive notice of the Registrar's decision. In the event of a
decision adverse to the requesting party's interest being made, he may after an
appropriate interval make a further written request to the Registrar to initiate
fresh section 44 proceedings. In that event, the registrant will be unable to
plead res judicata either because of the inapplicability of the doctrine to sec-
tion 44 proceedings 66 or because a finding of use or circumstances excusing
non-use as at day X is not a finding in respect of such matters as at later day Y.
Nor will the Registrar's refusal to expunge under section 44 preclude a subse-
quent application to the Federal Court to expunge the mark on the grounds
that it has been abandoned in terms of subsection 18(1)(c). Since abandonment
involves not merely non-use but an intent to abandon the mark, 67 the
Regisrar's decision does not constitute a final finding on the issue of abandon-
ment; indeed he has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that issue. 68
It might at this point be inquired whether the requesting party's motives in
initiating section 44 proceedings are relevant in any way to the outcome. In
Kightley v. Reg. T.M.6 9 Walsh J. appeared to take the view that they were. He
said in the course of his judgment:
It must never be forgotten that while an important purpose of trade mark legisla-
tion is to protect a valuable asset of the owner of the trade mark and the goodwill
that goes with it, it is primarily the interest of the public which must be considered,
who should be protected from confusion by the use of a similar mark or the same
mark by others than the real owners or licensees thereof. Attempts by third parties
to take technical advantage of the provisions of the Act to take over for their
benefit, a well known trade mark of another to use it themselves, which would
result in confusion to the public, are to be discouraged, and there would be no pur-
pose in attempting to have the present trade mark expunged by alleged non-user
unless the Appellant who is engaged in the business of creating, developing and
promoting merchandising programs, lotteries and the like, had some such inten-
tion.
If a discretion to expunge exists under section 44 - which it is submitted
below is not the case - no doubt such considerations may be relevant.70 That
apart, it is suggested that such sentiments have absolutely no relevance to the
exercise of jurisdiction under section 44. They obviously have none where the
Registrar has initiated section 44 proceedings sua sponte. Why should the mat-
ter be any different simply because a requesting party has prompted the
Registrar into action? The registrant is either using or not using the mark;
special circumstances excusing his non-use may or may not be present. These
issues are unaffected by the motive of the third party in requesting that section
44 proceedings be initiated. How exactly his motive may in any event be tested,
6Supra note 62, at 181.
67 See note 19, supra.
68 The Noxema Chemical Co. v. Sheran Mfg. Ltd., [1968] 2 Ex.C.R. 446, 55
C.P.R. 147.
69 (1982), 65 C.P.R. (2d) 36 at 41 (F.C.T.D.).
70Even in those jurisdictions where such a discretion exists, the registration is
primafacie liable to be expunged unless some extraordinary circumstance is shown by
the registrant to exist: Carl Zeiss Stiftung's Trade Mark, [1970] R.P.C. 139 at 146 (H.C.
Aust.). The public interest is relevant, but the Court should not assume that the re-
questing party will automatically be entitled to registration if the mark is expunged: cf.
"McGREGOR Trade Mark", [1979] R.P.C. 36 at 55 (Ch.).
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since he is unable to give evidence either before the Registrar or the Court, 71 is
unclear. If indeed he does propose to adopt the mark himself if it is expunged,
then the question of confusion will be tested when he applies to register. The
Court should not attempt to second-guess the outcome of decisions on
registrability or opposition that are no more than a gleam in the requesting
party's eye. The answer to Walsh J.'s sentiments lies in what Kerr J. said in the
THERMOS case in dismissing a submission that the applicant for expunge-
ment there would merely take over the goodwill of the mark if it were expung-
ed on the basis of its generic quality: "In taking these proceedings the appli-
cant has followed a course which is legally available to it and seeks relief to
which it bona fide believes it is entitled under the law."' 72 This is precisely the
position of a requesting party in section 44 proceedings. The public interest
that unused marks be removed from the register is not outweighed by a
speculative inquiry about possible public deception with regard to a mark for
which no application has even been made.
Where he decides to act under section 44, whether of his own accord or
upon the written request of a third party, the Registrar will give notice to the
registrant requiring him to furnish within three months an affidavit or
statutory declaration showing whether the mark is in use in Canada in respect
of each of the wares or services specified in the registration. If the mark is not
in use, the affidavit must show the date when it was last in use and the reason
for the absence of use since that date. If, after hearing any representations
from the registrant and the requesting party, the Registrar is not satisfied on
the evidence that the mark is in use or that special circumstances excuse the
absence of such use, he will notify the registrant of his decision to amend or ex-
punge the registration. Amendment, rather than expungement, is appropriate
where the evidence indicates that the mark is being used, but in respect of only
some of the wares or services covered by the registration. 73 The Registrar does
not, however, have jurisdiction under section 44 to limit the territorial ambit
of the registration, even though the evidence of use is highly localized. 74
If the registrant fails to furnish any affidavit at all in response to the
Registrar's notice, the Registrar is entitled to decide without more ado to ex-
punge. He has jurisdiction under section 46 to extend the time limit for filing
the affidavit before reaching his decision. Once he has notified his decision to
expunge, however, the Registrar isfunctus officio and cannot grant any exten-
sion of time to the registrant to file an affidavit; the proper course is to appeal
the decision to the Trial Division of the Federal Court and to file the necessary
affidavit there. 
75
71 See text accompanying note 133 et seq., infra.
72 Supra note 11, at 127-28.
73 Union Electric Supply Co. v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 56 at 60
(F.C.T.D.); Parker-Knoll Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1977), 32 C.P.R. (2d) 148 at 159
(F.C.T.D.); Somafa A.G. v. Ldo Bernard Ltde (1971), 65 C.P.R. 261 at 262 (Reg.
T.M.).
74 Supra note 69, at 46.
75 Wolfville Holland Bakery Ltd., supra note 49, at 172 (Fox Pat.), 92 (C.P.R.);
Arnsteiner v. Reg. T.M. (1972), 3 C.P.R. (2d) 103 (F.C.T.D.); Ford Motor Co. of Can.
v. Reg. T.M. (1978), 36 C.P.R. (2d) 135 at 137 (F.C.T.D.).
Occasionally, the reason for a registrant's failure to file an affidavit is that the
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V. FORM OF THE EVIDENCE
Subsection 44(1) requires the registered owner "to furnish ... an affidavit
or statutory declaration" showing use or special circumstances excusing non-
use. By subsection 44(2) the Registrar shall not receive any evidence other than
such affidavit or statutory declaration. On any appeal from the Registrar's
decision to the Federal Court, under subsection 56(5), "evidence in addition to
that adduced before the Registrar may be adduced." The following questions
of form and procedure arise from these provisions:
A. Need the affidavit go further than simply stating that the mark is in use?
B. Must the deponent be the registered owner and no other person?
C. May only one affidavit be filed by the registrant before the
Registrar?
D. Do the same rules on these points apply on appeal to the Trial Division?
E. Is the requesting party precluded from filing evidence or cross-examining
on the registrant's affidavit(s) either before the Registrar or the Court?
In a recent case before the Trial Divison, Keepsake Inc. v. Prestons
Ltd.,76 Cattanach J. seems to have explicitly or implicitly answered all these
questions in the affirmative:
What an affiant must establish is facts from which a conclusion of "use" or "use
in the normal course of trade" would follow as a logical inference from the facts
established.... [T]he response to a notice under section 44 is limited to a single af-
fidavit sworn by the registered owner and no other person. In my opinion in the
event of an appeal it follows from the object and purpose of the section that any
additional evidence adduced on appeal must be likewise limited to an additional
affidavit or statutory declaration of the registered owner to preserve the objective
of the section." 77
Authority on these matters is not, however, entirely clear.
A. How detailed must the Affidavit be?
The evidence filed must show either use of the mark or special cir-
cumstances excusing non-use. Presumably, both issues may be canvassed alter-
natively in the affidavit. At one time it was thought sufficient compliance with
the requirements of section 44 for the registrant to file an affidavit simply
stating in conclusory form that the mark was in fact in use. 78 As a result of the
Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Plough (Canada) Ltd. v. AerosolFillers
Registrar's notice has gone astray. Since the giving of notice implies an actual receipt by
the intended recipient (Holwell Securities Ltd. v. Hughes, [1974] 1 All E.R. 161 (C.A.);
Sun Alliance and London Assurance Co., [1975] 1 All E.R. 248 at 253 (C.A.)), the
Court has had little difficulty in setting aside the Registrar's decision to expunge in such
a case: Tooke Bros. Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1964), 25 Fox Pat. C. 176, 45 C.P.R. 162
(Ex.Ct.). It is doubtful whether the Court, should under such circumstances take the
further step of adjudicating on the substantive issue, since a failure to give notice means
that no date has been fixed as at which use or non-use can be judged.
76 (1983),.C.P.R. (2d).(F.C.T.D.).
77Id. at..
78 The lowpoint of this practice was surely reached in the Registrar's decision in Re
Bristol-Myers Co. (1974), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 97, accepting as sufficient the conclusory af-
fidavit of a secretary in the employ of a registered user.
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Inc. ,79 such an affidavit will plainly no longer be acceptable as evidence of use.
As the Court pointed out, "it is not the filing of the affidavit but what it shows
that matters." 80 The affidavit should detail the facts surrounding the use or
non-use of the mark in respect of each of the wares or services covered by the
registration, so that the Registrar may form a conclusion whether such facts
constitute "use" of the mark in terms of sections 2 and 4 of the Act or whether
the non-use is excusable.
The question how elaborate an affidavit must be obviously involves a nice
matter of judgment. It was perhaps inevitable that, for a period after the
Court of Appeal's decision in Plough, somewhat lengthier affidavits and argu-
ment before the Registrar in section 44 proceedings ensued, resulting in the
matter almost taking on the hue of a full-scale court proceeding for expunge-
ment on grounds of abandonment.81 The Trial Division seems however to have
corrected this swing of the "jurisprudential pendulum." '82 In Union Electric
Supply Co. v. Reg. T.M.83 Mahoney J. criticized the Registrar's insistence on
obtaining elaborate factual evidence: "There is absolutely no justification in
putting a trade mark owner to the expense and trouble of showing his use of
the trade mark by evidentiary overkill when it can be readily proved in a
simple, straightforward, fashion. Use must be shown, not examples of all
uses." He found acceptable an affidavit from a senior employee of the
registrant, which detailed the way in which the mark was used in practice and
included a sample of its use. Mahoney J. did, however, indicate that in some
cases a more detailed affidavit may be required: so long, however, as sufficient
reliable facts are shown to permit the Registrar, making all proper inferences,
to find use, he is not entitled to demand further and better evidence. 84 Where,
however, the affidavit shows relatively isolated uses, it should also show facts
that would justify the inference that the uses were not token uses but were in
the normal course of trade. 85
B. Must the Deponent be the Registrant and no other person?
Cattanach J. is not the only judge who considers that the affidavit must
be "sworn by the registered owner and no other person." ' 86 To similar effect,
Dub6 J. in Harris Knitting Mills Ltd. v. Reg. T.M., 87 while allowing that
multiple affidavits may be made by the registrant, considered that "the
registered owner may not file affidavits from other persons at that stage," that
is before the Registrar. Subsection 44(1) simply states, however, that the
registered owner is required to furnish an affidavit or statutory declara-
tion - it does not specifically require that the affidavit be made by him.
79 Supra note 64. See too S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Reg. T.M. (1981), 55 C.P.R.
(2d) 34 (F.C.T.D.).
8 Plough, supra note 64, at 687 (F.C.), 45 (N.R.), 68 (C.P.R.).
81 Gadban, supra note 57, at 633-34.
82Empire Clothing Mfg. Co. v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 180 at 185
(F.C.T.D.).
13 Supra note 73, at 57.
8Id. at 59-60.
85 Keepsake Inc., supra note 76, at
86Id.
87 (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 158 at 164 (F.C.T.D.).
1983]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Walsh J. made this point when holding that an affidavit made by the president
of an assignee corporation, rather than the registrant at the date of the section
44 notice, was validly furnished under subsection 44(1): the subsection "merely
requires the registered owner 'to furnish' an affidavit or statutory declaration
but does not state that it has to be made by him." 88 Where there has been a re-
cent assignment, where use has been by registered users, or where a certifica-
tion mark is involved (and the mark owner is therefore not permitted to use the
mark himself), 89 the registrant may only be in a position to give hearsay
evidence of use or special circumstances excusing non-use. Since the Registrar
refuses to accept hearsay evidence as a rule, 90 to require the registrant to fur-
nish such evidence is in effect to require him to submit to expungement. The
question is really whether the hearsay rule should be relaxed in such cases or
whether affidavits should be permitted from the persons other than the
registrant who are best able to depose as to use or special circumstances excus-
ing non-use. The Registrar seems to have been willing to relax his insistence on
non-hearsay evidence in cases where the mark has recently been assigned 9' but,
on principle, proceedings under section 44 should be conducted with due
regard to the hearsay rule. After all, no one other than the registrant is allowed
to furnish evidence and cross-examination by either the Registrar or the re-
questing party is not permitted. 92 It is precisely in cases such as this, where the
evidence cannot be tested but must be accepted or rejected at face value, that a
due insistence on the observance of rules of evidence designed to ensure
reliability and veracity, as is the case with the rule against hearsay, 93 is needed.
Read naturally, the language of subsection 44(1) therefore supports Walsh J.'s
conclusion 94 in preference to that of Cattanach J. 95 and Dub6 J.,96 a conclu-
sion which has the added advantage of avoiding inconvenient and perhaps ab-
surd results.
C. May more than one Affidavit be filed before the Registrar?
Normally, When words in the singular are used in legislation they include
words in the plural. 97 Thus, when the words "an affidavit or statutory declara-
tion" are used in subsection 44(1), they should include more than one affidavit
or declaration "unless a contrary intention appears." 98 The authorities on this
8 8Kightley, supra note 69, at 44-45.
89 Subsections 23(1),(2). See Mister Transmission (International) Ltd. v. Reg.
T.M., [1979] 1 F.C. 787 at 794, 42 C.P.R. (2d) 123 at 128-29.
9 Scott, Evidence in Trade Mark Cases (1968), 60 C.P.R. 28 at 36-37; Metcalfe,
The Opposition Practice: Burden of Proof and Related Obligations and Responsibilities
(1980), 8 P.T.I.C. Bull. 414 at 415.
91 Re Socift de Fabrication et de Distribution de Parfumerie et Cosmdtiques
Diparco S.A. (1975), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 229 at 231 (Reg. T.M.).
92 See text accompanying note 133 et seq., infra.
93 Teper v. R., [1952] A.C. 480 at 486, 2 All E.R. 447 at 449, 2 T.L.R. 162 at 164
(P.C.).
94 See text accompanying note 88, supra.
95 See text accompanying note 85, supra.
96 See text accompanying note 87, supra.
97 Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, s. 26(7).
98 Id. at s. 3(l).
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point are, however, not consistent. The Registrar himself has occasionally ask-
ed the registrant to supply a supplementary affidavit when the initial affidavit
filed has not been considered by him to be sufficient, 99 a practice which has
been judicially approved. 100 No doubt, such an affidavit may be considered
merely as a substitute or adjunct to the first; if Cattanach J. is right,
however,' 0' the Registrar's practice on this point may, strictly speaking, be
considered suspect, even though convenient.
So far as court decisions on the point are concerned, Walsh J. in Parker-
Knoll Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. 102 suggested, albeit with some doubt, that where the
registrant is a corporation, more than one affidavit may be filed by officers on
behalf of the corporation. This view was followed by Dub6 J. who said that
the Registrar may allow more than one affidavit to be filed from the registrant,
in that case also a corporation. i03
Interestingly enough, Walsh J. may have recently modified his tentative
views expressed in Parker-Knoll. In Kightley v. Reg. T.M. 104 where an af-
fidavit had been filed before the Registrar and a further affidavit filed before
the Court on appeal, Walsh J. considered both as pieces of evidence without in
any way discriminating between proceedings before the Registrar and those
before the Court: "[W]hether one or more affidavits is required depends upon
the circumstances." 105
The arguments either way are finely balanced. The question is really
whether a contrary intention appears precluding "an affidavit or statutory
declaration" to be read in the plural. If one reads subsection 44(1) together
with subsection 44(2), which prohibits the Registrar from receiving "any
evidence other than such affidavit or statutory declaration," in the context of
the Act as a whole, it is difficult at first sight to resist the view that the
Legislature really intended only one affidavit to be filed before the Registrar.
The restricted language of subsections 44(1) and (2) can be contrasted with
other occasions upon which the Registrar is entitled to receive evidence
without limitation. Thus, to prove distinctiveness of an otherwise
unregistrable mark, an applicant "shall furnish the Registrar with evidence by
way of affidavit or statutory declaration ... and with any other evidence that
the Registrar may require in support of such claim;" 106 where registration is
based on a foreign registration, a certified copy of the registration must be fur-
nished "and such other evidence as the Registrar may require fully to establish
his right to registration under this Act;" 107 in opposition proceedings, both ap-
99Re Lipton's Fashion Wear Ltd. (1974), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 141 at 142; John Labatt
Ltd. v. The Cotton Club Bottling Co. (1976), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 115 at 117 (F.C.T.D.).
100 Harris Knitting Mills Ltd., supra note 88, at 164; The Molson Co's., supra note
62, at 162 (6 affidavits filed by registrant without adverse comment by Court).
101 Keepsake Inc., supra note 76.
102 Supra note 73, at 153n.
103 Harris Knitting Mills, supra note 88, at 164.
104 Supra note 69.
101 Id. at 45.
106 Subsection 31(1).
107 Subsection 30(1). A similar provision exists where the Canadian application is
based on a foreign filing: s. 33(c).
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plicant and opponent must be given an opportunity "to submit the evidence
upon which they rely;" 108 on an application to register the transfer of a mark,
the Registrar shall register "[u]pon being furnished with evidence satisfactory
to him of the transfer;" 109 upon an application to register a licensed user, the
applicants shall, in addition to certain specified matters, furnish the Registrar
with "such further documents, information or evidence as may be required by
the Registrar;" 110 on appeals from the Registrar or on motions to rectify the
register before the Federal Court, the proceedings are determined summarily
"on evidence adduced by affidavit unless the court directs otherwise," in
which case, "oral evidence" may be introduced generally or in respect of one
or more issues specified by order of the Court.I' In none of these cases is there
any limit on the quantity of the evidence to be adduced; the only limits concern
its nature, namely, whether it is written or oral. When these provisions are
compared with subsection 39(2), which provides for "a declaration" that the
applicant has commenced use before registration of a mark allowed on the
basis of proposed use can occur, and are paralleled with subsections 44(1) and
(2) the contrast is striking.
As against this must be pitted the presumption that the legislature does
not intend to create an absurdity," 2 a factor which may be relevant in con-
sidering whether a contrary intention appears. Some of the arguments on this
point have already been noted in connection with the question whether the af-
fidavit must be made only by the registrant. "3 In the ordinary case where the
registrant holds and uses an ordinary trade mark, no difficulty should arise in
insisting on only one affidavit. But where the mark is used by registered users
or is a certification mark which of necessity is not used by the mark owner, or
where an assignment has recently taken place, proof of use or special cir-
cumstances excusing non-use may be more complicated. If a due insistence on
the rule against hearsay be observed, as has been urged, then there seems no
other option available than permitting more than one affidavit to be filed at
this stage. The need to keep the proceedings summary and relatively un-
complicated should not be unduly prejudiced by such a course which is likely
to arise only in a minority of cases. In short, the spectre of section 44 being
transformed into full-scale expungment proceedings does not loom large.
There is one additional point of a similar functional nature here. It is ac-
cepted all round that additional evidence may be filed by the registrant on ap-
peal to the Trial Division, although the permissible quantity of that evidence is
uncertain. 14 If this is so, an artificial limit on the quantity of evidence which a
registrant may furnish before the Registrar will mean that in some cases only
the Trial Division will be in a position to adjudicate the issues properly. This is





112 Recently applied in Paul v. The Queen (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 455 at 485-86
(S.C.C.).
1
13 Text accompanying notes 86 et seq., supra.
114 See text accompanying notes 128 et seq., infra.
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the Trial Division, a result which could not have been contemplated by the
Legislature. The Registrar is as capable of assessing the evidence revealed in
multiple affidavits as is the Trial Division, a task which the Registrar regularly
performs in opposition proceedings. If a choice is to be made between
eliminating the Registrar as the initial decision-making forum in certain cases
and limiting the range of evidence available to him, then the structure of sec-
tion 44 would suggest the first option is preferable. In such an instance, it may
be open to ask whether the Legislature would, if asked, have made an amend-
ment to the Act making it clear that one affidavit alone could be furnished
before the Registrar. 115 It is submitted that the Legislature would not have
made such an amendment, thereby preserving the ordinary rule that singular
words include the plural. What is clear is that the suggestion made by Walsh J.
and Dub6 J. above,1 16 that more than one affidavit may be made where the
registrant is a corporation, but in no other case, is unwarranted. There seems
no reason to prefer corporations 117 over individual traders in such cases. The
concept of "one-ness" does not admit of flexibility. Once it is admitted that
more than one affidavit may be filed, it must logically be accepted that this
position pertains whether the registrant is a real or artificial person.
D. Do the same rules apply on appeal to the Trial Division?
Subsection 44(5) indicates that the Registrar's decision to expunge is sub-
ject to appeal. Section 56 of the Act' 1 8 provides that appeals from any decision
of the Registrar go to the Trial Divison of the Federal Court. By subsection
56(5), "[o]n the appeal evidence in addition to that adduced before the
Registrar may be adduced and the Court may exercise any discretion vested in
the Registrar." The question arises whether the registrant or requesting party
may adduce such further evidence as he wishes, without limitation, on appeal
to the Court. This requires some consideration of the nature of an appeal
under section 56.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Reg. T.M. 119 Jackett P. held, in an appeal by an
applicant for registration against an adverse decision of the Registrar on the
registrability of the mark, that an appeal under section 56 is to some extent a
"new trial". If no further evidence is adduced on appeal, where the question
involves a practical question of fact the Court's function is to determine
whether the Registrar's decision was right or wrong, giving due weight to that
decision as one by an experienced official whose daily task is to adjudicate
such matters. 120 Subsection 56(5) however permits new evidence to be adduced
without leave of the Court; 121 whether the evidence was available at the earlier
115 A test suggested as useful in Blue Metal Industries Ltd. v. Dilley, [1970] A.C.
827 at 846-47, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 357 at 363-64 (P.C.).
116 Text accompanying note 103, supra.
117 Are partnerships also included?
118 As am. by the Federal CourtAct, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 64 (2).
119 [1968] 2 Ex.C.R. 523 at 527-28, 38 Fox Pat. C. 127 at 132-33, 55 C.P.R. 49 at
54-55.
120 Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. St. Regis Tobacco Corp., [1969] S.C.R. 192, 1
D.L.R. (3d) 462, 57 C.P.R. 1.
121 Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Ltde., [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 163, 36 Fox Pat. C.
111, 52 C.P.R. 175.
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hearing is irrelevant. 122 Where, therefore, fresh evidence is adduced on the ap-
peal, the Court's task is to consider both that evidence and the evidence before
the Registrar. Insofar as that evidence adds nothing to what was before the
Registrar, the question may still be whether the Registrar was right or wrong in
fact and in law.123 Insofar as the evidence does change the picture which ex-
isted before the Registrar, the Registrar's view is obviously of less importance
being based upon different evidence and the Court may more freely substitute
its decision for that of the Registrar. 124
The difficulty with section 56 is that it is a general provision applying to
appeals from all decisions 25 of the Registrar, without purporting to recognize
that the nature of an appeal may very well differ depending upon the nature of
the decision appealed from. Section 56 is obviously applicable to appeals from
decisions under section 44, but the real question is whether the jurisprudence
developed in relation to appeals from decisions as to registrability or in opposi-
tion proceedings should be applied entirely to section 44 appeals. Some of that
law must clearly apply. If, for example, the registrant has overlooked the
necessity for filing evidence timeously with the result that the Registrar has
quite correctly expunged the registration, the Court on appeal is faced with the
choice of either affirming the Registrar's decision with the result that a mark
which is in fact being used will be expunged, or of accepting the evidence
which ought to have been filed before the Registrar and reaching its own deter-
mination as to use. The Court has adopted the latter course because of the
drastic consequences of following the former and because, after all, subsection
56(5) does not in terms limit the nature of the further evidence which may be
filed. 126 To this extent, the Court's role on the appeal is similar to that on ap-
peals from decisions in opposition or on registrability, namely, to consider all
the evidence in determining whether the case under section 44 has been made
out. Once the court had taken that step, of course, it became very difficult to
prevent an unsuccessful registrant, who had filed inadequate evidence before
the Registrar, from having a second opportunity and bolstering his case on ap-
peal with further evidence. The Court was prepared to take this further step.
At the same time it sought to ensure that the appeal hearing before it was no
different in kind from that which the Registrar was entitled to undertake.
Thus, in Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. Reg. T.M. 127 Jackett P. held that
the requesting party was not entitled to file evidence or to cross-examine on the
registrant's affidavits. An appeal in section 44 proceedings should be limited
to the issues which were before the Registrar, namely, whether the evidence ad-
duced by the registered owner made it appear that the mark was in use or
whether special circumstances excused non-use. To permit the requesting party
to file evidence when this was not permitted before the Registrar would be to
" 2Id.; Standard Oil case, supra note 119.
"23 Beverley Bedding & Upholstery Co. v. Regal Bedding & Upholstery Ltd. (1982),
60 C.P.R. (2d) 70 at 71 (Fed. C.A.).
12 Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. St. Regis Tobacco Corp., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 22
at 31n. 4, rev'd on other grounds, supra note 120; Nic-Mat Industries Ltd. v. Clark
Equipment Co. (1976), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 131 at 136 (F.C.T.D.); Calona Wines Ltd. v.
Bay-Charles Restaurant Ltd. (1980), 51 C.P.R. (2d) 19 at 22 (F.C.T.D.).25Broderick's case, supra note 51, at 274.
126 See note 75, supra.
127Supra note 51.
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change the character of the appeal into a motion to expunge the mark on the
grounds of abandonment.
It therefore follows that, if more than one affidavit may be filed by the
registrant before the Registrar, and if that affidavit may be by someone other
than the registrant, as submitted in the previous sections, then the same posi-
tion should pertain before the Federal Court. Cattanach J. in the Keepsake
case1 28 seems to support this position insofar as he considers that the same
position should prevail both before the Registrar and the Trial Division
although, as has been seen, he takes a more restrictive view of what material
may be placed before the Registrar. Similarly, Walsh J. 129 and Dub6 J. 130 have
had no difficulty in accepting that the evidence before the Trial Division may
be multiple affidavits made either by the registrant himself or by anyone else
whom the registrant chooses to put forward. The matter is plainly one within
the discretion of the Federal Court, paying due regard to the nature of section
44 proceedings. 131 If such a course can be considered convenient before the
Registrar, the position before the Court must be afortiori. If the Registrar has
held the mark liable to be expunged, the registrant should not be foreclosed
from demonstrating through as much evidence as he chooses to adduce why it
should not. If the Registrar's decision has been against expungement, again
the fact that this view is being challenged by the requesting party should entitle
the registrant to bolster his case as much as he can to prevent the appeal being
successful and to prevent the valuable property right represented by his
registration being taken away.
One might go further. Even if it is the position before the Registrar that
only one affidavit may be filed, subsection 56(5) does not in terms limit the
number of affidavits which may be filed before the Court on appeal. The same
reasons as have been suggested above for permitting the filing of multiple af-
fidavits before the Registrar are all the more cogent when the matter is finally
being appealed. Insofar as the Court has any discretion, it should be exercised
in such a way that the registrant may fairly make his case against expunge-
ment. If the choice lies between allowing the filing of multiple affidavits and
reaching a wrong decision, it is submitted that only one course should be taken
by the Court.
In light of this ability to file further evidence on appeal, a registrant-
appellant who therefore gambles on the sufficiency of his evidence before the
Registrar and chooses not to bolster his case before the Court is unlikely to
persuade the latter to give him another opportunity to file further evidence
before the Registrar in the event that the Court agrees with the Registrar's
holding of non-use. Having rolled his dice, he cannot complain that they have
turned up against him. 132
128 Supra note 76.
129 Kightley, supra note 69, at 45.
130 Harris Knitting Mills, supra note 87, at 164.
131 Presumably such a decision falls within that class of matters described as the
practice or procedure of the Federal Court, whic_ the Supreme Court of Canada is un-
willing to review: Smith v. Min. of Nat. Rev., [1965] S.C.R. 582 at 585, 52 D.L.R. (2d)
93 at 95, [1952] C.T.C. 257 at 260.
132 Plough's case, supra note 64, at 689 (F.C.), 47 (N.R.), 70 (C.P.R.); Johnson's
case, supra note 79, at 38-39.
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E. Is the requesting party precluded from filing evidence or cross-examining
on the registrant's affidavit(s)?
This is at least one matter upon which the authorities seem relatively con-
sistent. Thurlow C.J. for the Federal Court of Appeal has said quite bluntly:
"In my view, evidence submitted by the party at whose instance the s-s. 44(1)
notice was sent is not receivable on the appeal from the Registrar any more
than it would have been receivable before the Registrar.' '133 There had been
prior deviations from this view before the Federal Court. Thus, in one case af-
fidavits were received from the requesting party and relied on apparently
without objection before the Trial Division. 134 In another, Noel A.C.J.
granted the requesting party an extension of time to file affidavits designed to
show that the registrant's affidavit claiming use was in fact false. The Judge
said:
If such a course of action is not adopted, there is a possibility that there may be no
other means of correcting a situation which, in the event the facts disclosed in the
affidavit are found to be false, would allow a wrong decision or one based on false
or incorrect evidence to remain uncorrected and to refuse a right of appeal under
such circumstances may result in a denial of justice. 1
35
It is plain that this decision cannot stand in light of the subsequent
holding of the Federal Court of Appeal noted above. Yet the problem remains:
what if the registrant does file a false affidavit? Is there no way of challenging
it? It seems not. The Federal Court has consistently refused the requesting par-
ty leave to cross-examine on the registrant's evidence, 136 thereby making it
clear that cross-examination before the Registrar would equally be improper.
The requesting party is limited to pointing out deficiencies in the registrant's
evidence. Thus, the crafty deponent who hides his non-use behind skilfully
drafted affidavits is more likely to be found out than the outright rogue who is
prepared to swear falsely. And, in a perverted way, proceedings for expunge-
ment on grounds of abandonment might well fail in such a case: does not the
rogue who is prepared to swear falsely demonstrate in the most vivid way his
intent not to abandon the mark? The courts' insistence on the absence of any
right to cross-examine or to file evidence on the part of the requesting party is
based on the fear that the proceedings will become something more than the
summary proceedings they are intended to be. This is true to some extent,
although the fear may be exaggerated. There seems no reason in policy why
cross-examination should not be permitted upon the requesting party follow-
ing the sort of procedure Nodl J. was prepared to accept in the context of filing
evidence in reply, namely, producing evidence tending to indicate that the
registrant has sworn falsely. The issue is a relatively confined one likely to be
raised only in a tiny minority of cases; the spectre of drawn-out proceedings
thus seems rather far-fetched. As it is, however, the door to this procedure
seems to have been firmly closed by the weight of decisions.
"I Plough's case, supra note 64, at 688 (F.C.), 46 (N.R.), 69 (C.P.R.).
134 The Molson Co's., supra note 62, at 173-75, 182.
131 Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. Kiewel-Pelissier Breweries Ltd. (No. 1), supra
note 63, at 215.
136 Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., supra note 51; foll'd in Estde Lauder Cosmetics
Ltd., supra note 51, at 5.
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VI. WHAT DOES "IN USE" MEAN?
The evidence must show that the mark is "in use" in Canada. "In use"
suggests something more than merely past or isolated use; it implies some con-
tinuity and regularity in the use.
The concept of "use" that is referred to in section 44 is not merely "use"
in the ordinary sense of that word. "Use" is defined in section 2 of the Act as
meaning "any use which by section 4 is deemed to be a use in association with
wares or services." From the facts and exhibits contained in the affidavit, the
tribunal must therefore be able to draw the inference that the mark is being us-
ed in such a way that the requirements of section 4 are fully satisfied. 137 That
section reads:
(1) A trade mark is deemed to be used in association with wares if, at the time of
the transfer of the property in or possession of such wares, in the normal course of
trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in which they are
distributed or it is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of
the association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is
transferred.
(2) A trade mark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is used or
displayed in the performance or advertising of such services.
(3) A trade mark that is marked in Canada on wares or on the packages in
which they are contained is, when such wares are exported from Canada, deemed
to be used in Canada in association with such wares.
Subsection 4(3) is self-explanatory. The principal problems which have
arisen have revolved around the concept of use in subsection 4(1) in respect of
marks applied to wares. We shall examine these first in some detail, and then
look briefly at subsection 4(2) as it applies to service marks.
A. Date at which use must be shown.
It is settled that the relevant date at which the mark must be shown to be
in use is the date of the Registrar's notice; uses occurring after that date are ir-
relevant. 138 Such a view may sometimes entail hardship, especially when a sec-
tion 44 notice intervenes between an order for the marked goods and their
delivery. Where this occurred in John Labatt Ltd. v. Rainier Brewing Co. 1
39
following a lull of some twenty months after the last sale of the marked goods,
the Trial Division nevertheless held the mark to be "in use". The Court com-
mented that "One must consider the whole of the evidence to determine
whether or not there has been de facto abandonment of the trade mark or if
the registrant does not seriously intend to pursue the use vigorously." 140 This
does not seem quite right; non-abandonment and an intent to use, if relevant
131 Plough's case, supra note 64, at 684 (F.C.), 43 (N.R.), 66 (C.P.R.). See general-
ly, Morrow, The Concept of 'Use' under Canadian Trade Mark Law (1976), 7 P.T.I.C.
Bull. 589.
138 Parker-Knoll, supra note 73, at 152-53; Aerosol Fillers Inc. v. Plough (Can.)
Ltd. (1979), 45 C.P.R. (2d) 194 at 198 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd without reference to this point,
supra note 64; Harris Knitting Mills, supra note 87, at 161n.2; Kightley, supra note 69,
at 44; Keepsake case, supra note 76, at..
139 (1982), 68 C.P.R. (2d) 266 (F.C.T.D.).
140Id. at 270. This language tracks that appearing in the 1938 U.K. Act, 1 & 2 Geo.
6, c. 22, s. 26(l)(b) (supra note 42): it does not appear in the Canadian Act.
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at all, should be treated as no more than factors in determining whether a use
occurring some time prior to a section 44 notice may still, given the sporadic
nature of a particular trade, be considered as continuing up to the date of the
notice; 141 they should not, however, be employed to change the character of a
use occurring after a section 44 notice into one somehow deemed to have oc-
curred before that notice. Any consequential residual hardship may be
alleviated by a finding of special circumstances excusing non-use. 142
B. Genuine Commercial Use.
The use must be "in the normal course of trade" as contrasted with a
"token" use, namely one manufactured for the sole purpose of attempting to
lay claim to or preserve the mark. 143 Clearly, one sale in Canada may amount
to such a use and even demonstrate that the mark is "in use". But dealing on
such a modest scale must be strictly proved and will be carefully scrutinized:
according to one judge, "[T]here must be a normal commercial transaction in
which the owner of the trade mark completes a contract in which a customer
orders from the owner [of] the trade mark wares bearing the trade mark which
wares are delivered by the owner of the trade mark pursuant to such contract
to such customer."'144 A trade mark owner who requests a provincial liquor
board to acquire his marked liquor so that he may repurchase it145 or so that it
may be held to his account 146 will not have used the mark in the "normal
course of trade;" the use may be called a "token" or "colourable" use,
manufactured for the purpose of attempting to satisfy the criteria of section 4.
Thus, in the Keepsake case, where two sales of jewellery were relied on to show
that the mark was in use, Cattanach J. considered that something more than
the fact of such sales was required to indicate that the sales were in the normal
course of trade: "[A] simple allegation of facts could and should have been
made from which it could be inferred that the two sales in question had been
made in the normal course of trade as for example in response to an order
placed by telephone or in writing by the purchasers citing the catalogue iden-
tification of the merchandise ordered." 147 The Judge was satisfied that the
sales were transacted in the normal course by a further affidavit filed before
him which showed extensive use of the mark in the United States and which
showed "an active and continuing interest in the trade mark." 148 So an
isolated order for specified fabricated equipment placed in the United States
by an American buyer to an American manufacturer, for shipment, assembly
and use by the buyer or to his order in Alberta', may not qualify as a transfer in
141 Cf. Parker-Knoll case, supra note 73, at 159.
142 No such circumstances were found present in Rainier Brewing Co., supra note
139 at 270.
143 See, e.g., The Noshery Ltd. v. The Penthouse Motor Inn Ltd. (1969), 61 C.P.R.
207 at 213 (Ont.H.C.).
144 The Molson Co's., supra note 62, at 177 (per Gibson J.).
145Id. at 180.
146National Distillers & Chemical Corp. v. Corby Distilleries Ltd. (1978), 45
C.P.R. (2d) 274 at 276 (Reg. T.M.).
147 Supra note 76, at .
148 How this latter point demonstrates that sales in Canada were in the normal
course of trade is unclear.
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Canada in the normal course of trade, where further dealings in Canada with
the equipment are not contemplated. 149
This raises the question how one is to judge what is in the "normal"
course of trade. Is it sufficient that goods bearing the mark have been sold in
what appears a normal commercial transaction, or should further inquiry be
made to see whether the sale was normal in terms of how the mark owner
generally conducts his business? The second inquiry does not generally seem to
have been undertaken, but it may be at least as, if not more important than,
the first. Jerome A.C.J. may have had this point in mind when he criticized a
registrant's affidavit for failing to adduce facts from which the Registrar could
determine whether the mark had been used in the normal course of trade. 15 0
The Judge considered that the Registrar should be provided with evidence as to
the nature of the registrant's business and its ordinary practices before he
could be expected to make such a decision. Although this view has not gained
much support in the more recent decisions of the Trial Division, there is
something to be said for it. A token use can occur even on what appears to be
an arms-length transaction. Once it is accepted that the user's purpose in
adopting and employing a mark is relevant in order to determine whether the
mark truly qualifies as a trade mark, 151 then arguably purpose is equally rele-
vant in determining whether the use of the mark is in the normal course of
trade. For example, if the mark owner does not really intend to trade in the
goods at all in the sense of acquiring goodwill and profits from the marked
goods, but merely intends to block another trader from acquiring rights in a
mark, and his only use of the mark is a limited distribution unaccompanied by
the normal promotional support he gives his other products, it may well be
questioned whether his use of the mark can really be called normal. To hold
that it can be so called might be thought to permit literal compliance with the
Act's requirements of "use" to prevail over the spirit and intent of the trade
marks legislation as a whole. This theory will equally cut the other way to in-
clude genuine but sporadic uses as sufficient to keep the mark in use, where the
trade is necessarily of an intermittent nature. 152 It is therefore suggested that a
proper affidavit of use under section 44 should at least present facts from
which the inference may legitimately be drawn that the use is a genuine
business use in this latter sense. 
153
149 Tubeco Inc. v. Assoc. Qudbdcoise des Fabricants de Tuyau de Bdton Inc. (1980),
49 C.P.R. (2d) 228 (F.C.T.D.).
50 S.C. Johnson & Son Inc., supra note 79, at 37. In Institut National desAppella-
tions d'Origine des Vins et Eaux-de-Vie v. Reg. T.M. (1983),_C.P.R. (2d)
.. (F.C.T.D.) Rouleau J. found the evidence insufficient to convince him that the
registrant's sales of wine through its wvinery, rather than through liquor board outlets,
was outside the "normal course of trade." He rejected an argument that he should find
what was the normal course of trade for the wine-selling industry, commenting that this
would "create an onerous burden on the Courts." This seems correct: industry stand-
ards should be relevant only to indicate that the registrant's use is not a genuine com-
mercial use, not to dictate a method of trade contrary to a registrant's honest business
judgment.
151 Imperial Group Ltd. v. Philip Morris & Co., [1982] F.S.R. 72 (C.A.).
152 See, e.g., Rainier Brewing Co., supra note 139.
153 Possibly the U.S. advertising and sales referred to in the Keepsake case, supra
note 148, were relevant to this issue.
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The word "trade" is also important. A trade mark is defined in section 2
as a mark used to distinguish wares or services "manufactured, sold, leased,
hired or performed" by one person from those of another. The word trade in
section 4 is thus the antithesis of "gift" and contemplates some payment or ex-
change (for example, barter) for wares or services supplied. Free distribution
of promotional material or advertising gimmicks displaying the mark may be
normal commercial use but may not be trade use. 154 Similarly, test marketing
of a product 155 or the mere sending of samples, whether free156 or not,15 7 may
not amount to a normal trade use. But use of a mark only once a week by a
business which operates in that way is permissible; there is no requirement that
a mark be used daily.'
58
C. Marking or Otherwise Giving Notice of the Mark.
To constitute use, the mark must be "marked on the wares themselves or
on the packages in which they are distributed" or must be "in any other man-
ner so associated with the wares that notice of the association is then given to
the person to whom the property or possession is transferred." 159 The mark
should be so placed that it would come to the notice of the reasonable reci-
pient: "to place a word or device mark on some small part of an elaborate
piece of equipment where it would not be seen in the course of ordinary use
may well not amount to a use of the mark at all, as in the case of a mark too
small to be seen." 160 Specimens or photographs of the mark as used, together
with material showing how and when it was used, should therefore normally
be included in the affidavit.
Whatever marking or notice occurs must be apparent "at the time of
the transfer of the property in or possession of such wares." The courts have
interpreted this requirement quite broadly. Thus, the mark has been held to be
used in Canada where goods were sold for delivery to a Canadian destination
f.o.b. a United States port. The court considered that the transfer of physical
possession of the goods in Canada satisfied section 4; the fact that property
and possession in terms of provincial Sale of Goods legislation may have pass-
ed in the United States was thought immaterial. 161 The question here is not
154 C.LS. Ltd. v. Sherren (1978), 39 C.P.R. (2d) 251 at 257-58 (Reg. T.M.); Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons Ltd. v. Corby Distilleries Ltd. (1978), 42 C.P.R. (2d) 264 at 267-68
(Reg. T.M.), foll'ing "HOSPITAL WORLD" Trade Mark, [1967] R.P.C. 595 at
598-99 (Reg. T.M.).
'55Noxzema Chemical Co. of Can. v. Kimberly Clark of Can. Ltd. (1974), 15
C.P.R. (2d) 132 at 133 (Reg. T.M.).
156 Fisons Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sales Affiliates Inc. (1973), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 123
at 126 (Reg. T.M.).
157 Addidas (Can.) Ltd. v. Nippon Rubber Co. (1976), 28 C.P.R. (2d) 141 at 145
(Reg. T.M.).
58 TheNosheryLtd. v. The Penthouse Motor lnn Ltd., supra note 143.
159Boliden Aktiebolag v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of Can. (1974), 14 C.P.R.
(2d) 222 at 228 (F.C.T.D.) (stencilling or engraving on drums of chemicals held 'use').
"6Pioneer Electronic Corp. v. Reg. T.M. (1977), 17 Aust.L.R. 43 at 52 (H.C.
Aust.).
161 Manhattan Industries Inc. v. Princeton Mfg. Ltd. (1971), 4 C.P.R. (2d) 6 at
15-17 (F.C.T.D.).
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who used the mark, rather whose mark is being used. 162 Thus, subsequent
resales of the wares in Canada qualify as use of the mark to the mark owner's
benefit, whether or not such sales are made by the mark owner. 163
However, some uses which the commercial world might recognize as valid
trade mark use may not qualify under subsection 4(1) by virtue of the "proper-
ty or possession" limitation. In Phil Borden Ltd. v. Uarco Inc. Jackett C.J.
said:
As of yet, I have not been able to conceive why utilization of trade marks on wares
prior to sale or delivery would not, in some cases, be an appropriate use (e.g., at
trade fairs, on display counters, etc.), nor why use of the trade mark on wares
would not be appropriate unless it was affixed at the time of sale or delivery (e.g.,
sales in bulk under arrangements for the trade mark to be attached by the pur-
chaser after sale). 164
However appropriate the uses mentioned by Jackett C.J. may be in commer-
cial terms, it seems difficult to include them within the definition of use in sec-
tion 4. Thus, merely advertising the mark, 165 mentioning it in promotional
literature,166 or placing it in the lobby of one's business premises 167 are not uses
within subsection 4(l), unless the mark is also attached to the wares
themselves 168 or is in some way physically associated with them. Invoices using
the mark and accompanying the wares may, however, qualify. 169 The relevant
use must of course occur in Canada. 1
70
D. Use must be as a Trade Mark.
The use referred to in section 4 must be use of the trade mark. 171 This in-
volves a number of considerations:
1. Who is using the mark?
The right person must use the mark. In the case of a certification mark,
this means the licensees of the mark owner, since the definition of such a mark
162Marchands Ro-Na Inc. v. Tefal S.A. (1981), 55 C.P.R. (2d) 27 at 33 (F.C.T.D.);
Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Can. Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. (1982), 68 C.P.R. (2d)
1 at 25-26 (F.C.T.D.).
,63Marchands case, supra note 162; Uarco Inc. v. Phil Borden Ltd., [1973] F.C.
650 at 661-62, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 97 at 107 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd (1975), 24 C.P.R. (2d) 140
(Fed. C.A.).
164 (1975), 24 C.P.R. (2d) 140 at 143 n. 2.
165La Maur Inc. v. Prodon Industries Ltd. (1971), 2 C.P.R. (2d) 114 at 116
(S.C.C.); Saxon Industries Inc., supra note 21, at 96.
166 Clairol International Corp., supra note 7, at 564-65 (Ex.C.R.), 190-91 (Fox
Pat.); J.H. Munro Ltd. v. Neaman Fur Co., [1947] Ex.C.R. 1 at 7.
167 Union Electric Supply Co. v. Reg. T.M. (No. 2) (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 179 at
180 (F.C.T.D.).
168 Clairol case, supra note 7, at 564 (Ex.C.R.), 190 (Fox Pat.). Tags attached to the
wares also qualify: Union Electric Supply Co. v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 56 at
59 (F.C.T.D.).
169 Boliden's case, supra note 159; Gordon A. MacEachern Ltd. v. National Rub-
ber Co., [1964] Ex.C.R. 135 at 143.
170 Supra note 161, at 17.
171 As "trade mark" is defined in s. 2.
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provides that the mark owner cannot himself be in the business for which the
mark is registered. 172 But for ordinary marks the only relevant use is that of the
registered owner, his predecessor, or a licensee registered under section 49. Use
by an unregistered licensee does not count as the owner's use, even where the
licensee is the wholly-owned company or subsidiary of the registrant. 173 The
more relaxed view, albeit under differently worded legislation, prevailing in
the United Kingdom, 174 the United States, 175 Australia176 and South Africa, 
177
that non-deceptive use by an unregistered licensee is a use in the course of trade
by the registered owner so long as adequate control is exercised over the way in
which the mark is used, has hitherto not been accepted in Canada. 178
In Kightley v. Reg. T.M. 179 it was held that use of the mark by an
unregistered assignee should qualify as use for the purposes of section 44.
Walsh J. noted the prevailing view that the assignment of a registered mark is
effective without the need to record the transfer on the register. Of course, use
by an unregistered assignee may result in the mark becoming non-distinctive
and liable to expungement upon a motion to rectify the register, 180 but an in-
quiry of this character cannot be carried out under section 44.
2. Mark must be intended or recognized as a trade mark
The registrant must intend to use the word as a trade mark or, whatever
his intention may be, the public must recognize that the word is being used to
indicate trade source. 181 Where the word or device in question is primarily a
business or corporate name, it is a question of fact whether the manner in
which the trader uses his name is something more than mere use as a trade
name but also qualifies as use of the word as a trade mark. Where services
rather than wares are involved, the onus may be somewhat more easily
satisfied. Two cases may be usefully contrasted. In Cartem Inc. v. Souhaits
Renaissances Inc.182 a manufacturer of cardboard boxes used its corporate
name Cartem Inc. on its stationery, business premises and delivery trucks.
However, it never referred to its goods in its invoices or advertising as
172 Mister Transmission (International) Ltd., supra note 89.
173 Mayborn Products Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1983),..C.P.R. (2d).(F.C.T.D.);
see too, cases in note 12, supra.
174 Revlon Inc. v. Cripps&Lee Ltd., [1980] F.S.R. 85 (C.A.).
175 Lanham Act, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 s. 5, makes use of a mark by a "related
company" inure to the benefit of the registrant, provided that the mark is not used in
such a manner as to deceive the public. "Related company" is defined in s. 45 as mean-
ing "any person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant ... in
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the
mark is used."
176 PioneerElectronic case, supra note 160.
177The position in South Africa may now be different; see Adcock-Ingram
Laboratories v. S.A. Druggists Ltd., [1983] 2 S.A.L.Rep. 350 at 354 (Transraal Prov.
Div.).
178 Barrigar, op. cit., supra note 12.
179 Supra note 69, at 45-46.
180 Motel 6 case, supra note 12.
181 British Petroleum Co. v. Bombardier Ltd. (1971), 4 C.P.R. (2d) 204 at 215
(F.C.T.D.); aff'd (1973), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 21 (Fed. C.A.).
182 (1982), 60 C.P.R. (2d) 1 at 3 (F.C.T.D.).
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"Cartem" goods. Addy J. held the word "Cartem" had been used not as a
trade mark but as a trade name. Cartem neither intended to use its corporate
name as a trade mark, nor did those with whom it dealt recognize its use as
anything other than the use by the company of its name. 183 On the other hand,
in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain184 the use of PLAYBOY MEN'S
HAIR STYLIST over a shopfront and in the yellow pages of a telephone direc-
tory was held to be use not merely as a trade name but also as a trade mark in
respect of the services of men's hair styling. Marceau J. admitted that "in
practise [sic] the distinction between a trade name and trade mark when used
in association with services may be very difficult to draw", 185 but nevertheless
accepted that the user's intention was to advertise his services through use of
the phrase.
Similarly, where the words are descriptive, the user must use them in such
a way that the public recognizes the use as that of a trade mark and not a mere
descriptive term. Thus, in the SHREDDED WHEAT case, 186 one of the
reasons why the plaintiff's registration was held invalid was its failure to make
clear on the cereal packaging that the words were not being used merely to
refer to the product rather than the manufacturer. 187 One method commonly
employed to this end is to add the words, "Brand", "TM", "®" or
"Registered" after the mark. Although the Act nowhere mandates such
usages, they may well prove useful in marginal cases, so long as the usage is
consistent and deliberate attempts are made to eschew using the same words in
a descriptive sense. 188
3. Use must be so as to distinguish registrant's wares from others' wares
The use must be for the purpose of distinguishing that trader's wares from
those of others. A trader who marks another trader's mark on his wares and
makes it clear that the mark belongs to the second trader will not have used the
mark as a trade mark. By acknowledging proprietorship of the mark in
another, he has indicated that his use of the mark is not so as to distinguish his
goods from those of other traders. 18 9 Thus, trader A's use of trader B's mark
183 To similar effect, see J.H. Munro Ltd. v. Neaman Fur Co., supra note 166, at
6-7 ("CANADA'S GOLD MEDAL FURRIERS" not use of "GOLD MEDAL FURS"
mark) and Union Electric Supply Co. v. Reg. T.M. (No. 2), supra note 167, (merely in-
scribing a wares mark in the lobby of the building where the mark owner does business
held not use as a trade mark: no physical association with the goods was present). Cf.
Dubiner v. Cheerio Toys & Games Ltd., [1965] 1 Ex.C.R. 524 at 559 (affd, [1966]
S.C.R. 206) (use of abbreviated form of company name "Cheerio" on boxes and in-
voices a trade mark use in terms of s. 47(2) ).
184 (1978), 39 C.P.R. (2d) 32 (F.C.T.D.), aff'ing (1977), 35 C.P.R. (2d) 43 (Reg.
T.M.); aff'd (1979), 43 C.P.R. (2d) 271 (Fed. C.A.).
185Id. at 36-37 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd (1979), 43 C.P.R. (2d) 271 at 274 (Fed. C.A.).
186 Can. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Can., [1938] 2 D.L.R. 145 at
151-52, 55 R.P.C. 125 at 142 (P.C.); see too Dubiner's case, supra note 183, at 549
(BEGINNERS for toys invalid, being "descriptively used for the purpose of indicating
that the wares were easy of operation and for beginners as contrasted with one of better
quality").
187 See too Jos. Schiltz Brewing Co. v. John Labatt Ltd. (1978), 45 C.P.R. (2d) 258
at 266 (Reg.T.M.) (GUSTO for beer).
18SLeco Industries Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1980), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 102 at 108
(Reg.T.M.); cf. In ReMinnetonka Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772 at 779 n. 12 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
189 British Petroleum Co. v. BombardierLtd., supra note 181, at 213-14.
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on a comparison chart attached to A's product was held not a trade mark use
in terms of section 4; no attempt was thereby made to indicate that the origin
of trader B's goods was in any one other than trader B. 190
E. Use of substantially same mark
The use involved must be of the mark in question, not some other
mark. 191 This requirement has been viewed quite broadly. The courts have
recognized that a mark, especially a label or device mark, is often developed
over time to improve its impact or to respond to changing fashions; artwork is
modernized or improved, letterpress is rearranged, additions and omissions
are made. 192 To demand precision and constancy in the use of marks in such
circumstances is to defy commercial realities and to cry for the moon.
The same point is inferentially recognized in article 5C.2 of the 1934 Lon-
don Revision of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property which Canada ratified in 1951.193 That article provides that use of a
trade mark by a proprietor "in a form differing in elements which do not alter
the distinctive character of the mark from the form in which it was registered
in one of the countries of the Union shall not involve cancellation of the
registration, and shall not prejudice the protection granted to such mark."
Although Canadian courts are not bound directly by this provision but only by
the legislation purporting to implement it, they may be guided by it to the ex-
tent that it does not conflict with the Act, proceeding on the presumption that
Canada intends to perform rather than deliberately break its treaty obliga-
tions. 194 The article in terms applies only to a limited situation, namely, local
use of a mark based on a foreign registration, and is principally intended to
allow modifications to suit local conditions (for example, to change German
letterpress to English when a German mark seeks registration in an English-
speaking jurisdiction), but its underlying principle is just as applicable to all
registered marks. This may be seen from the fact that a similar test is employed
in the Act in subsection 14(2) in judging for the purposes of registrability
whether a Canadian application is fairly based on a foreign registration; 195 that
190 Cilrol case, supra note 7, at 566-68 (Ex.C.R.), 192-94 (Fox Pat.).
191 Unlike the U.K. Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 22 (s. 26(1) proviso,
s. 30(1) ), use of the mark in relation to wares of the same description as those contained
in the registration or use of an associated mark (see Canadian Act s. 15) is not con-
sidered by s. 44 as use of the registered mark.
192 See generally, Marks, "Dressing" a Trademark to Protect a Modern Image Re-
quires Careful "Tailoring" (1976), 66 Trademark Reporter 12. In Exparte The Hanna
Paint Mfg. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. 217 (Comm. Pat. 1954) the Commissioner of Patents ac-
cepted that a 1905 mark was still being used despite elimination of outmoded design
features: "Registrant has merely modernized its label to make its appearance more in
keeping with the times. Such modernization is not uncommon, particularly when almost
half a century has elapsed since the registration issued, and where the picture is, by its
nature, tied to a past era."
193 [1951] 10 Can. T.S., 139 British and Foreign State Papers 758, [1938] Great Bri-
tain No. 15 (Cmnd. 5833).
194 See McDonald, Using Treaties to Interpret Canadian Intellectual Property
Statutes (1976), 7 P.T.I.C. Bull. 615 at 618.
19 To this extent, s. 14(2) is designed to implement art. 6B.2 of the London Revi-sion.
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the Registrar uses much the same principle in determining whether to allow
amendments to a pending mark application; 196 and that similar principles are
legislatively and judicially applied in the United Kingdom. 1
97
Although the Act does not expressly consider the question of how far
deviations from the mark as registered may be allowed while still counting as
use of the mark, the courts themselves have fashioned a test which seems to be
applied in most cases where use is in issue and which seems broadly in line with
that suggested by the Convention: has the registrant used substantially that
mark? If so, use of the former will be treated as use of the latter. Such a ques-
tion is partly one of fact and degree, and partly one of law. 198 The mark in use
must be compared with the mark as registered, and the significance of any dif-
ferences judged from the viewpoint of potential customers or dealers. The test
established under former trade mark legislation in determining whether the use
was substantially the same, namely, whether anybody has been or is likely to
be deceived or injured by the deviation, 199 continues to be applied to the cur-
rent Trade Marks Act.
200
The application of the "substantially similar" test may vary depending
upon whether the mark in question is a word or a label mark. In the case of a
mark consisting of an invented word, any change which would affect its ap-
pearance 201 or pronunciation 20 2 is probably objectionable. Thus, the court has
doubted whether a mark PINE-L for disinfectants could be treated as a use of
the mark PINE'L.2° 3 In the case of a common word 2° 4 or combination of
words, however, changes in spelling, punctuation and syntax, or the addition
of other words or artistic material, may be more tolerable. Thus, the applicant
for PLAYBOY MEN'S HAIR STYLIST for hairdressing services was permit-
ted to rely on his prior use of PLAYBOY HAIR STYLIST, PLAYBOY
MEN'S HAIR STYLING(S) and PLAYBOY MENS HAIRSTYLISTS to sus-
tain his application for registration based on prior use.20 5 Similarly, the mark
GOLD MEDAL FURS was held used even though the labels attached to the
196Trade Marks Regs. C.R.C., c. 1559, s. 36(b), which provides than an applica-
tion may not be amended at any time "to change the trade mark except in respects that
do not alter its distinctive character or affect its identity."
197 Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 c. 22, s. 30(1), 35(1) (U.K.); Kerly, supra
note 44, at paras. 19-12.
198 Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain, supra note 184, at 274 (Fed. C.A.).
199Honey Dew Ltd. v. Rudd, [1929] Ex.C.R. 83 at 89; J.H. Munro Ltd. v. T.
Eaton Co. Western (1942), 2 Fox Pat. C. 204 at 217-20, [1943] 2 W.W.R. 195 at 203-206
(B.C.S.C.).
2
w" Playboy case, supra note 184, at 36 (F.C.T.D.), at 274 (Fed. C.A.).
201 Cf. HUGGARS Trade Mark, [1979] F.S.R. 310 at 317 (Ch.) (HUGGERS dif-
ferent from HUGGARS although "ordinarily a change of vowel in an unstressed
syllable could not be a material difference").
202 Cf. "OTRIVIN" Trade Mark, [1967] R.P.C. 613 at 614-15 (OTRIVINE is
materially different from OTRIVIN for purposes of s. 35(1) of 1938 U.K. Act).
203American Cyanamid Co. v. Record Chemical Co. (1972), 7 C.P.R. (2d) 1 at 7
(F.C.T.D.); aff'd on other grounds (1973), 14 C.P.R. (2d) 127 (Fed. C.A.).
2
04Cf PELICAN Trade Mark, [1978] R.P.C. 424 (PELIKAN for pens not
substantially different from PELICAN).205Supra note 200.
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goods referred to CANADA'S GOLD MEDAL FURRIERS; the dominant
feature of the mark was GOLD MEDAL and other advertising used both the
exact and the imprecise form of the mark, so that in all the circumstances
nobody would be deceived by the deviating use. 206 There however comes a
point where the mark is really a combination of elements, so that an attempt to
isolate and highlight one rather than the combination as being the mark will
fail. 207
In the case of label marks or marks comprising words written in a special
script, changes in subsidiary letterpress or artistry will be tolerated as permis-
sible deviations, so long as the dominant features of the mark remain
constant. 208 Thus, presenting the dominant features of the mark in plain con-
secutive capital letters instead of in a scroll with the words differently arranged
has been held permissible, where no other matter has been added or omitted.
20 9
Similarly, changing the name of the mark owner after assignment of the mark,
where other features of the mark made up its distinctive character, has been
held permissible. 210 However, changing the shape of the label and its design
and adding further material of potential trade mark significance has resulted
in a finding that the mark as registered has not in fact been used. 21' Changes
mandated by packaging and labelling regulations should generally be
disregarded,2 1 2 although such changes should not provide a general warrant to
modify the mark any more than is reasonably necessary to accomodate the
regulations.21 3 On the other hand, a word mark may be used even where its
presentation is in something other than plain capital letters. Thus, Noel A.C.J.
has indicated that use of a word mark in ordinary capitals may be treated as
use of the word presented in "fancy lettering or in small case lettering or in
script, ' 214 and no doubt the converse may apply; in both cases, so long as the
dominant feature of the mark is the word itself rather than the artistry by
which it is presented, use may be established.
26J.H. Munro Ltd. v. T. Eaton Co. Western, supra note 199; see too General
FoodsLtd. v. SunmarkInc. (1980), 61 C.P.R. (2d) 120 at 125-26 (Reg.T.M.).
The strength of the holding in the Munro case is however affected by the subse-
quent decision of the Exchequer Court holding that the discrepant use was not in fact
used as a trade mark and holding the mark improperly registered: J.H. Munro Ltd. v.
Neaman Fur Co., supra note 166, at 7.
2
07 Reg. T.M. v. G.A. Hardie & Co., [1949] S.C.R. 483 at 498-99, 44 D.L.R. 582 at
597-98, 8 Fox Pat. C. 228 at 242per Kellock J.208 Crush International Ltd. v. Canada Dry Ltd. (1979), 59 C.P.R. (2d) 82 at 86-87
(Reg. T.M.).
2 Honey Dew Ltd. v. Rudd, supra note 199, at 88-89.
210Carling O'Keefe Breweries Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., supra note 162, at
18-19.
211 The Molson Co's. v. Mitches & Co. (1980), 50 C.P.R. (2d) 180 at 182
(F.C.T.D.).
212Saccone & Speed Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 119 at 126
(F.C.T.D.), following dicta in the Molson case, id.
213 One wonders whether the changes in the label in Saccone & Speed, supra note
212, were rather more than warranted by the mere presence of bilingualism regulations.
214 American Cyanamid case, supra note 203 (a case involving the question of what
mark was used for the purpose of basing an application to register on such use).
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F. Use in relation to services.
A more relaxed test of use is laid down in respect of a service mark than is
the case for a mark for wares - necessarily so, since ex hypothesi there may
be no wares to mark. By subsection 4(2) a mark is deemed used in association
with services "if it is used or displayed in the performance or advertising of
such services." The following points should be noted:
First, the provision contemplates that services are in fact being provided
or offered. 215 Advertising in advance of offering the services apparently is not
considered by the Registrar as use.216 By contrast, a United States court has
taken the more realistic position that use sufficient to support a United States
registration in respect of services is present in the case of "[o]pen and
notorious use of a mark in connection with the advertising of services within a
commercially reasonable time prior to the actual rendition of service .... "217
Secondly, where the user's trade name and trade mark are similar, it must
be clear that the use intended is of the mark, rather than the name. 218 Mere
listing in the regular or yellow pages of a telephone directory may qualify as
"advertising" but will likely only be use of the trade name, unless the use is
such that it can be seen by the public or is clearly intended by the subscriber to
be use of the mark. 219 Thus, a listing of "Chicken Chalet Bar-B-Q Ltd."
followed by the address is a use of the trade name rather than the mark
"Chicken Chalet Bar-B-Q".
220
Thirdly, use in Canada requires that the services advertised or performed
be actually performed in Canada. Thus, an American restaurant or amuse-
ment park may certainly advertise its services in Canada, but unless those ser-
vices are actually available in Canada (that is, there are outlets here), there is
no use in Canada;221 there must be some business facility here. 222 On the other
hand, an American factory advertising its tennis court resurfacing services in
Canada was held to have used its mark in Canada; even though the constituent
materials were manufactured in the United States, the services of necessity had
to be performed in Canada.
2 3
2 15 Porter v. Don The Beachcomber, [1966] Ex.C.R. 982 at 988.
216 Denman Place Investments Ltd. v. Hefru Food Services Ltd. (1972), 8 C.P.R.
(2d) 199 at 201 (Reg. T.M.).
217 Kinark Corp. v. Camelot Inc., 548 F. Supp. 429 at 442 (D.C.N.J. 1982).
218 See text accompanying notes 182 et seq., supra.
219 Playboy case, supra note 184, at 274 (Fed. C.A.).
220 Chalet Bar B-Q (Can.) Inc. v. Foodcorp Ltd. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 56 at 69-70
(Fed. C.A.).
2 Porter, supra note 215; Marineland case, supra note 19.
"'Motel 6 case, supra note 12, at 57 (U.S. motel taking and confirming Canadian
reservations made directly or through automobile associations not using the mark in
Canada).
M Wenward (Can.) Ltd. v. Dynaturf Co. (1976), 28 C.P.R. (2d) 20 at 25 (Reg.
T.M.).
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VII. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXCUSING NON-USE
Where the mark has not been used, to avoid expungement or amendment
the registrant must show that non-use was "due to special circumstances that
excuse such absence of use." 224 The fact that subsection 44(1) prevents any
person other than the Registrar initiating section 44 proceedings before a
period of three years has elapsed after registration may be taken as a legislative
indication that this period should normally be considered the maximum start-
up time for a registrant to commence serious commercial use.
The leading case on subsection 44(3) is Cattanach J.'s decision in John
Labatt Ltd. v. The Cotton Club Bottling Co.225 After some eight years of non-
use after registration, an American registrant entered into an agreement under
which an Ottawa *firm would manufacture goods under the mark as a
registered licensee. This agreement was abandoned after a few weeks because
of inadequate market interest, and the mark had not been used for a further
two years prior to the sending of the section 44 notice. The registrant admitted
the non-use but claimed that special circumstances existed by virtue of its in-
tention to use the mark as soon as favourable market conditions appeared in
Canada. Cattanach J. allowed an appeal from the Registrar's refusal to ex-
punge the mark. He considered that the word "special" should be given its or-
dinary meaning of unusual, uncommon or exceptional. The circumstances
need not affect traders other than the individual registrant. However, the
voluntary decision of the registrant not to use the mark is not a special cir-
cumstance; subsection 44(3) envisages the operation of some external forces
preventing the mark's use, for example, a fire in the factory226 or import
restrictions. 227 That the registrant does not intend to abandon the mark is ir-
relevant; 228 its decision to refrain from use until market conditions are pro-
pitious is not a special circumstance.
Plainly, extensive use of the mark outside Canada 229 or even considerable
repute in Canada2 0 will not per se amount to a special circumstance excusing
non-use. The Registrar has taken the common sense view that "it is necessary
to consider not only the reasons advanced for non-use of a trade mark, but
also to weigh those reasons against the length of period of non-use. A reason
that may constitute a special circumstance that excuses absence of use for a
period of three years, may not excuse absence of use for a longer period of
"-4 ReMaggiS.A. (1974), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 100 at 102 (Reg. T.M.).
= (1976), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 115 (F.C.T.D.).
26Aktiebolaget Manus v. R.J. Fulwood & Bland Ltd. (1948), 66 R.P.C. 71 at 79
(C.A.) as hypothesized by Evershed L.J.
227 "'DAIQUIRI RUM" Trade Mark, [1966] R.P.C. 582 at 594 (Ch.); "BULO VA"
TradeMark, [1967] R.P.C. 229 at 223 (Ch.).
8 This requirement is specifically mentioned in both the U.S. and the U.K.
statutes (see text accompanying notes 43-48, supra), but is significantly absent from the
Canadian section.
229Re The Dover Engineering Group Ltd., supra note 56, at 124.
-3°Re Black Angus Franchise System Inc. (1975), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 171 (Reg. T.M.).
Cf. Porter, supra note 215, at 988-89, where the Court thought that such a fact might
entitle the Registrar in his discretion not to expunge. Quaere whether such a discretion
exists: see Section VIII, infra.
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years." 231 It should not be necessary to show that use was impossible, only that
it was commercially impracticable. 232 Special circumstances must be
understood and applied in a business sense.233 Self-induced impossibility
however does not seem relevant here, any more than it operates in the law of
contract to frustrate an agreement. Thus, where a mark for liquor was not us-
ed because the registrant took no steps over a period of years to qualify himself
under provincial law to sell such goods, the court held that no special cir-
cumstances existed sufficient to bar expungement. 234 Further, the cir-
cumstances must be the reason why the registrant did not use the mark; "if in-
dependently of the special circumstances, there would be non-use, then non-
use would not be due to the special circumstances." 235 The fact that the mark
has been recently assigned will not absolve the assignee from providing
evidence of special circumstances in respect of the assignor's non-use.
236
Some difficulty may arise when dealing with trades which are claimed to
be cyclical in character, for example, toys and fashion garments. In the past
the Registrar has accepted that a temporary stoppage in use of a mark was a
special circumstance when the affiant claimed that intermittent usage was a
feature of that particular trade and where he demonstrated an intent to recom-
mence use in the immediate future.2 37 The Trial Division too has accepted this
somewhat relaxed view of special circumstances in Harris Knitting Mills v.
Reg. T.M.238 At the time of the section 44 notice, the registrant of the mark
ULTRALON in respect of knitwear had not used the mark for three years
after having used it extensively for seventeen. There had been no market de-
mand for knitwear made from the ULTRALON yarn and the registrant had
accordingly stopped using the mark, in the expectation (justified by subse-
quent events) that changes in fashion would shortly resurrect that demand and
cause him to start using it again. Dub6 J. noted that the registrant
demonstrated a continuing interest in the mark, unlike the registrant in John
Labatt239 who had not even bothered to appear at the appeal hearing; he show-
ed "a clear intention to resume use, the sole condition being the market condi-
tion and not any voluntary act of" the registrant. 24 Dub6 J. accordingly held
231 Re Rixona Conserven B. V. of Holland (1974), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 102 at 104 (Reg.
T.M.); Re Goldwell Ltd. (1974), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 110 at 111 (Reg. T.M.) (17 years non-
use).
232 Manus case, supra note 226.
233 "BALI" Trade Mark, [1966] R.P.C. 387 at 406 (Ch.). "The reasons for non-use
which have been accepted as special circumstances include product failure, sickness of
the registrant, bankruptcy of the registrant, inability to negotiate a licence agreement,
inability to market the product economically at current prices, and the unavailability of
the necessary raw materials for manufacture": Working Paper on Trade Marks Law
Revision (Ottawa: Dept. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1974) 259.
234 The Molson Co's, supra note 62, at 180.
235 "BULOVA " case, supra note 227, at 235.
236 Re Socidtif de Fabrication et de Distribution de Parfumerie et Cosm~tiques
Diparco S.A., supra note 91, at 231-32.
237 Re Regal Toy Ltd. (1975),29 C.P.R. (2d) 239 at 240 (Reg. T.M.).
28 Supra note 87.
239 Supra note 225.
240Supra note 87, at 163.
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that special circumstances existed and permitted the registration to continue.
With respect, to say that non-use was not the "voluntary act" of the registrant
seems an abuse of language; the registrant chose not to use the mark because it
thought, no doubt correctly, that no-one would buy the marked goods at that
time. Harris seems to say that a registrant is entitled to stop use as demand for
the marked goods falls off; he may subsequently justify this non-use as a
special circumstance upon demonstrating that he will resume use if he thinks
people will want those goods again at some future hypothetical time. Dub6 J.
seems almost to suggest that so long as the registrant has not abandoned the
mark, it should not be expunged under section 44.241 This somewhat relaxed
treatment of special circumstances, admittedly a factual inquiry dependent
upon the particular circumstances, is not generally followed in the United
States under a comparable provision. 242 The U.S. Commissioner of Patents
has held that "Decreased demand for a product and its resultant withdrawal
from the market do not constitute special circumstances which excuse nonuse
within either letter or . . . spirit of the statute," even where the registrant
deposes that the use has been temporarily discontinued and that he proposes to
resume it when conditions warrant.
243
The difficulty with such cases is of course that the assertions of the affiant
as to the special features of his trade cannot be tested in any way but must be
accepted at face value. Perhaps the best that can be done is to insist upon a
demonstrated intent on the part of the affiant to recommence use of the mark
by a certain date. Upon the date passing, the Registrar should send a fresh sec-
tion 44 notice requiring the registrant to furnish evidence of use. Unless this is
furnished or some clear and plausible reason given why use has not occurred
despite the previous assertions, the mark should be expunged.
VIII. IS THERE ANY DISCRETION NOT TO EXPUNGE?
Upon a finding that there has been no use or special circumstances excus-
ing non-use, subsection 44(3) states that the registration of such trade mark "is
liable" to be expunged or amended. Subsection 44(4) continues that the
Registrar should give notice of his decision when he "reaches a decision as to
whether the registration of the mark ought to be expunged or amended." The
question arises: once the finding has been made, does the Registrar have any
discretion not to expunge? If he has, then of course the Federal Court on ap-
peal may also exercise the discretion, 24 paying due regard to the constraints
imposed upon appellate review of a discretionary power.
245
The problem could have been avoided had section 44 used either the for-
mula "the Registrar shall" or "the Registrar may" expunge. In the former
case, expungement would have been mandatory, in the latter, discretionary.
246
Under the British Act, the latter formula is used; the Registrar "may" ex-
241A view contrary to his own position in Lindy, supra note 12, at 130, that s. 44 is
not an alternative method of expunging for abandonment.
242Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 s. 8(a) (1946).
243 Exparte Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 118 U.S.P.Q. 368 at 369 (1958);
similarly Exparte TheDenver ChemicalMfg. Co., 118 U.S.P.Q. 106 (1958).
244 Subsection 56(3).
245 The Rowntree Co. v. Paulin Chambers Co., [1968] S.C.R. 134.
246 Cf. Can. Schenley Distilleries Ltd. v. Reg. T.M. (1974), 15 C.P.R. (2d) I at 10
(F.C.T.D.).
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punge, a form of wording which the courts have readily interpreted as impor-
ting a discretion. By virtue of such language, the registration should prima
facie be expunged unless the registrant demonstrates some clear case justifying
non-expungement. 247
The matter has not been the subject of definitive decision in Canada. In
one case, the presence of a discretion appears to have been conceded but the
Court expunged anyway. 248 In another, the Federal Court of Appeal doubted
the existence of the discretion and again expunged, since the reasons presented
for the exercise of any such discretion were unconvincing. 24 9 Jackett P. too
seems to have considered that no discretion exists when, in describing subsec-
tion 44(3), he said that "it does not provide for anything to be done by the
Registrar or by any other person. It creates a substantive rule." 250
It is submitted that no such discretion exists. The reason for the rather
awkward language in subsection 44(3) is not because the Legislature intended a
discretion to be conferred. Rather, it was for the purpose of enabling the
registrant to appeal the Registrar's decision to expunge. The alternative would
have been to permit the Registrar to expunge or amend in accordance with his
decision immediately and let the registrant then appeal this action. Pending ap-
peal, matters would have been left in some uncertainty; would the Court
reverse the Registrar and reinstate the registration or not? Could someone else
apply for the mark in the meantime? How ought the Registrar to deal with
such an application? The reasonable view seems to have been adopted that,
pending the registrant's decision to appeal, the registration should remain.
Once the time limit for appeal expired, subsection 44(5) required the Registrar
to act in accordance with his, decision. If an appeal was taken, the Registrar
would stay his hand and await the outcome of the appeal. The only lacuna
which seems to be exposed by such a scheme is that if the Trial Division holds
that expungement should occur, there is no automatic stay of that order pend-
ing a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. Perhaps the Registrar should stay
his hand in such a case until the expiry of time to appeal to the Court of Ap-
peal. However, to avoid such uncertainties, it might be preferable for the Trial
Division itself to stay the operation of any order to expunge pending the ex-
piration of the appropriate time limit for further appeal, and the Court of Ap-
peal might act similarly in case of any appeal being taken from its decision to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
IX. APPEALS
A number of questions concerning the nature of an appeal to the Federal
Court have already been dealt with in part D of Section V. Two further mat-
ters should be mentioned for the sake of completeness.
First, one or two cases have suggested that the Registrar's decision under
section 44 involves an exercise of his discretion, 2 1 thereby engaging the rather
stricter standard of review available to an appellate court when dealing with
247 J. Lyons & Co.'s Application, [1959] R.P.C. 120 at 130 (C.A.); Carl Zeiss Stif-
tung's Trade Mark, [1970] R.P.C. 139 at 142, 146 (H.C.Aust.).
248 Porter, supra note 215, at 988-89.
249 Plough case, supra note 64, at 68-69.
210 Noxzema case, supra note 68, at 452.
01 See, e.g., Kightley, supra note 69, at 41.
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such questions. 25 2 This view does not seem correct. Whether there has been use
is a mixed question of law (involving section 4 of the Act) and fact. It is not the
same sort of question facing the Registrar when he decides whether two marks
are confusing or whether registrability is established in light of section 12,
questions which the Supreme Court has recognized as being practical questions
of fact in the resolution of which the Registrar has particular experience.
253
The only questions of this character which seem to arise under the section 44
jurisdiction are ones such as whether a use has been in the normal course of
trade or whether special circumstances exist excusing non-use. The normative
features that adjectives such as normal or special conjure up involve something
more than making a mere finding of fact; they require the Registrar to resort
to his general experience and judgment in determining whether the facts
presented are truly normal or special. Such matters apart, the court should be
just as able on appeal as the Registrar to decide whether use existed. Whether
or not the appellate function is best characterized as a trial de novo, 254 this
does not appear to be one of those cases where any special deference should be
shown to the Registrar's views.
Secondly, the registrant against whom the Registrar has made an adverse
decision clearly has a right of appeal. By contrast, where the Registrar has
acted suo motu under subsection 44(1), a decision favourable to the registrant
is not appealable by anyone. The position when the Registrar has acted upon
the written request of a third party, seems just as straightforward. In Benson &
Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. Kiewel-Pelissier Breweries Ltd. (No. 2)255 Noel A.C.J.
held that the requesting person was a party to proceedings under section 44
and was entitled to appeal the Registrar's decision. 256 The converse must
logically be true, namely, the requesting party must be a party to the appeal
when the registrant challenges the Registrar's decision to expunge or amend his
registration. Thurlow J. so held in Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. Reg.
T.M.257 when, after referring to subsections 59(2) and (3), he said that
"[T]hese provisions confer on the person who instigates the subsection 44(1)
notice the right to file a reply for the purpose of contesting the appeal and
nothing more than the filing of such a reply is required to constitute that per-
son a party, and a proper party to the appeal." The Federal Court of Appeal
has endorsed these views in another context in its decision in Dr. Pepper Co. v.
Pepsico Inc., 258 holding that a person should be considered a party to an ap-
252 Supra note 245.
253 Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd. v. St. Regis Tobacco Corp., supra note 116.
254 See, e.g., Keepsake case, supra note 148, at.._
255 (1972), 5 C.P.R. (2d) 215 at 217 (F.C.T.D.).
256 The Court has consistently acted on this view: see, e.g., Estde Lauder case,
supra note 51; The Molson Co's., supra note 58; John Labatt Ltd., supra note 225; the
Plough case, supra note 64; the Kightley case, supra note 69.
He may possibly be entitled to appeal the decision when the Registrar has failed to
give him an opportunity to make representations pursuant to s. 44(2): cf. Cheerio Toys
& Games Ltd. v. Dubiner, [1965] 1 Ex.C.R. 579 at 585; but see Anheuser-Busch Inc.,
supra note 52.
257 Supra note 59, at 213.
258 (1975), 20 C.P.R. (2d) 274 (Fed. C.A.). The question was whether the applicant
to register was a proper party to an appeal by an opponent whose opposition had been
summarily dismissed under s. 37(4) for failing to state a substantial ground of opposi-
tion. The Court held that he was a proper party.
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peal if he is entitled to receive notice of the appeal;259 the right given by subsec-
tion 59(2) to reply to the appeal makes that person a party whether or not he
appears as such in the style of cause. 2 In view of his automatic status as party,
it is superfluous for him to seek leave to intervene or be added as a party.
However, in Parker-Knoll Ltd. v. Reg. T.M.,261 a case involving a
registrant's appeal from a decision to expunge, Walsh J., while affirming the
requesting party's right to appear and make submissions, stated that such a
person was not a party to the proceedings 262 and consequently could not have
costs awarded against him in the event of an appeal being unsuccessful. 263 The
weight of Walsh J.'s observations is reduced by the fact that this point was ap-
parently not argued 264 and no reference was made by the Judge to the
authorities in the previous paragraph. It would be anomalous if a person is
considered a party if he wishes to appeal but not if he appears to oppose a-
registrant's appeal. If he is to be at risk as to costs in the former case, 265 he
should equally be so in the latter. Further, if Walsh J. were right, it is difficult
to see how such a person could appeal an adverse decision of the Trial Division
to the Court of Appeal. In Mayburn Products Ltd. v. Reg. T.M.266 Cattanach
J. refused to follow Walsh J. on this point. The judge held that both the
Registrar and the requesting party should be considered as proper parties in
any appeal and should be designated as such in the style of cause. With
respect, this seems perfectly correct. Walsh J.'s views should accordingly be
treated as per incuriam.
X. CONCLUSION
In the Trademarks Bill of 1979,267 an equivalent to section 44 was includ-
ed, with a number of amendments designed to clear up some of the difficulties
revealed above. 268 Thus, the Registrar's authority to demand a supplementary
affidavit where he was not satisfied with the registrant's first affidavit was
made clear; 269 the registrant was required to state that he was not using the
mark only or primarily "to maintain trademark rights under this Act;" 270 and
a one-year period of grace during which the registrant could recommence use
259 The requesting party plainly is, in terms of s. 56(3), a "person who was entitled
to notice of [the Registrar's] decision": s. 44(4).
26 0 Cattanach J.'s preliminary comments to the contrary in Ports International Ltd.
v. Reg. T.M. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 209 at 211 (F.C.T.D.) should therefore be treated
as per incuriam.
261 Supra note 73.
2621d. at 155-56.
263Id. at 159. Walsh J. followed his view in Associated Biscuits of Can. Ltd. v.
Reg. T.M. (1980), 54 C.P.R. (2d) 211 at 213 (F.C.T.D.).
Given the premise that the requester is not a party, the conclusion that no costs
may be awarded against him seems to follow: Federal Court Rule 344. Accord: General
Motors of Can. Ltd. v. Nakin (1983), 46 N.R. 139 at 164 (S.C.C.) (Ontario Rules).
264Id. at 156.
265 Costs may be awarded against the unsuccessful registrant-respondent: Aerosol
Fillers Inc. v. Plough (Can.) Ltd., supra note 138, at 199, aff'd, supra note 64.
266 Supra note 173.
267 Bill S-11, 1979 (30th Parl. 4th Sess.). The Bill was not proceeded with.
268 Id. s. 42.
269 Id. s. 42(3).
270Id. s. 42(1)(b)(iii), (c)(iv).
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was provided for when the Registrar had found special circumstances excusing
non-use.
271
Reforms such as these are no doubt useful so long as one accepts the
premise of section 44 - a scheme whereby the registrant may proffer a ritual
affidavit the truth of which must be accepted at face value and which cannot be
tested by any means whatsoever, apart from a careful perusal of the language
used to see whether the affiant is trying to hide something by craft. If the fun-
damental basis of the Trade Marks Act is accepted, that a mark should be us-
ed in order to continue receiving the benefits of registration, then a scheme
whereby use or non-use can be demonstrated - not merely asserted - to ex-
ist should be established. The plethora of cases on section 44 has revealed that
too many registrants are simply not using their registered marks and, when
challenged, are hiding behind carefully chosen verbiage in their affidavit to
mask their non-use. Granting a requesting party the right to cross-examine or
to file affidavits in opposition would serve as a deterrent to this type of activi-
ty. Once this step is taken, nothing short of accepting the concept of a hearing,
rather like what already occurs before the Registrar in opposition proceedings,
seems acceptable. Whether this would increase the number of section 44 ap-
plications and overburden the Trade Marks Office and the Federal Court may
be doubted. Registrants seeking to protect their unused marks will continue
trying to do so for the same sorts of business reasons that motivate them cur-
rently. The only thing that would change is their likelihood of success.
Registrants who have in fact been using their marks will be able to demonstrate
that fact simply and will have no difficulty in maintaining the truth of their
averments under cross-examination. A requesting party will not appeal such a
case, unlike the present position where the very inadequacy of the procedure
before the Registrar encourages appeals. Registrants who do not have an in-
terest in their marks sufficient to have their oath tested by cross-examination
do not deserve the benefits the Act confers upon them and should have their
marks expunged in favour of someone who does really intend to use them. The
objection that registrants, especially foreign ones, would be unfairly penalized
by the expense of attending cross-examination could be met by conferring on
the Registrar the power to award costs and out-of-pocket expense to deter re-
questing parties abusing the system. In such a scheme, matters will more likely
be decided on the merits than on a desultory examination of what a deponent
really means in his affidavit and whether it formally meets the requirements of
use272 or special circumstances excusing non-use. In short, perhaps it would be
better to admit that section 44 has not been a resounding success and that its
structural defects cannot be remedied by papering over the cracks which have
appeared in its lop-sided edifice.
271 1d. s. 42(6).
272 Compare the semantic tortuosities which the Trial Division and the Court of
Appeal respectively were forced to engaged in in the Plough decisions, supra notes 138
and 64. To this extent the modifications to s. 44 recommended by the Working Paper
on Trade Marks Law Revision, supra note 233, at 265-67, seem to miss the point.
However much additional evidence the registrant is required to submit by the Registrar,
the value of such evidence is little unless it can be exposed to challenge by a requesting
party.
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